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ABSTRACT
Copyright protection from state offenders is onerous
because of the imbalanced bargaining power between states
and authors, which is increased by the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Allen v. Cooper. This decision clarifies that state
sovereign immunity is not abrogated by the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act of 1990 (“CRCA”). It secures states’
constitutional rights, the public interest, and the efficiency
of copyright infringement litigations against states.
However, a paradox of this decision is that it may harm
innovation incentives or spirits of creativity due to the
increased imbalanced bargaining power to prevent authors
from being repaired for their economic or non-economic
losses. This Article reviews the law and psychology literature
and proposes to adopt compelled and voluntary state
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apologies in the copyright regime. It suggests that the
apologies do not conflict with Allen’s benefits but can rebuild
the reputation of authors and repair relationships between
the authority and authors to promote or sustain their
innovation incentives.
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INTRODUCTION
It is the moment for the United States (“U.S.”) Congress
to pass new laws protecting copyrights from copyright
infringement by states.1 In a recent case, Allen v. Cooper, the
Supreme Court of the United States clearly decided that the
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990 (“CRCA”),
federal statutes regulating copyright protection against
states, is unconstitutional.2 Briefly, the reason is that
neither Congress’s power nor Article I, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, promoting innovation, abrogates state
sovereign immunity granted by the Eleventh Amendment.3
This reason has been applied as constitutionally correct by
the lower courts4 and there have been constitutional law
professors planning to add it in casebooks for teaching.5
However, to copyright owners, the consequence of this case
1. Meaghan H. Kent & Katherine C. Dearing, Surrendering to Stare Decisis:
Supreme Court Holds States Can Invoke Sovereign Immunity Against Claims of
Copyright
Infringement,
VENABLE
LLP
(Mar.
30,
2020),
https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/2020/03/surrendering-to-staredecisis-supreme-court-holds.
2. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (2020).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., eScholar LLC v. Neb. Dep’t of Educ., No. 8:20-CV-135, 2020 WL
6305453 (D. Neb. Oct. 28, 2020); Can. Hockey LLC v. Tex. A&M Univ. Ath. Dep’t,
No. 4:17-CV-181 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2020); In re Jones, 618 B.R. 757, 769 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 2020); Allegheny Def. Project v. FERC, 964 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2020); United
States v. Moore-Bush, 963 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2020).
5. See Josh Blackman, Allen v. Cooper Is an Excellent Opinion for Teaching
Sovereign
Immunity,
REASON
(Mar.
23,
2020
2:02
PM),
https://reason.com/2020/03/23/allen-v-cooper-is-an-excellent-opinion-forteaching-sovereign-immunity.
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is that they cannot sue a state in a federal court for using
their copyrighted works without a waiver of sovereign
immunity from the state or lack of due process.6 Therefore,
it turns back to Congress to fix the problem in the CRCA and
instruct copyright owners to effectively prevent copyright
infringement by states. Senators Thom Tillis and Patrick
Leahy have taken action by consulting the U.S. Copyright
Office to study the need and basis for abrogating state
immunity against state infringement.7 Otherwise, it may
only be in memory that copyright owners can sue a state for
remedies, especially monetary damages, in a federal court.8
Copyright owners, however, are perhaps hopeless for
changes in the near future. Congress has remained silent for
decades after Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, where the U.S. Supreme Court
decided that the Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act (“Patent Remedy Act”),9 federal
statutes regulating patent protection against states, was
unconstitutional—applying similar reasoning as in Allen.10
Florida Prepaid sets clear barriers to patent infringement
litigations against states and, since Florida Prepaid, lawyers
and courts have interpreted this case broadly to be applied
to copyright and trademark claims in addition to patent
claims.11 The U.S. Supreme Court recently affirmed this

6. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1007.
7. See Kevin Madigan, Allen v Cooper: The Epilogue: The Copyright Office
Embarks on a Journey to Determining Just How Bad the State Copyright
Infringement Problem
Is, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE (July 23, 2020),
https://copyrightalliance.org/ca_post/allen-v-cooper-the-epilogue.
8. See, e.g., Mills Music, Inc. v. Ariz., 591 F.2d 1278, 1287 (9th Cir. 1979).
The court rewarded the copyright owner monetary damages and attorney fees
against the State of Arizona for copyright infringement.
9. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act of 1992,
Pub. L. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992).
10. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999); Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d. 1278 (9th Cir. 1979).
11. See, e.g., Mitchell Feller, IP and Sovereign Immunity: Why You Can’t
Always Sue for IP Infringement, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 21, 2018),
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broad interpretation in Allen.12 Therefore, it would not be
surprising if Congress fails to pass any new laws addressing
copyright protection from copyright infringement by states
for another decade (or longer).
Should a copyright owner give up suits or disputes over
copyright concerns against a state offender after Allen?13 For
litigation efficiency, they should unless they have strong
interests that may be repaired without much monetary
damages. Bargaining power has always been imbalanced
between states and copyright owners.14 Due to this
imbalanced bargaining power, it is not surprising that there
have been few litigations or disputes against states for
copyright issues, either before or after Allen.15 States, state
governments, or state entities in this Article are a broad
definition for public entities that enjoy sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment, including but not limited to
state government agencies, public libraries, and public
universities.16 Before Allen, regardless of the barriers of
sovereign immunity, a state could successfully defend itself
under the fair-use doctrine and be held not liable to a
copyright owner. Allen, therefore, firmly adds more weight to
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/02/01/ip-infringement-sovereignimmunity/id=93050.
12. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (2020).
13. Copyrights are limited enforceable for specific expressions against some
offenders for their infringing acts. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106. Some offenders are
innocent rather than infringers because their use of the copyrighted works is
excluded from copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
14. Cf. Nicholas Dernik, State Sovereign Immunity: States Use the Federal
Patent Law System as Both a Shield and a Sword, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 134 (2008) (criticizing that states have an unfair advantage against
patentees due to state sovereign immunity in the Eleventh Amendment).
15. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-01-811, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: STATE
IMMUNITY IN INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS (2001).
16. See State Sovereign Immunity, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-11/state-sovereignimmunity (last visited July 19, 2020) (“In evaluating such a claim, the Court will
examine state law to determine the nature of the entity, and whether to treat it
as an arm of the state.”); see, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 280 (1977) (finding that local school districts are not an arm of a state).
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the already imbalanced bargaining power held by states. In
other words, Allen provides dual contributions: it serves as
an example for state sovereign immunity in law teaching and
promotes litigation efficiency by avoiding unnecessary
copyright litigation against a state.
The decision in Allen, nevertheless, may conflict with the
ultimate goal of the copyright (or even the whole intellectual
property (“IP”)) regime—promoting innovation and creative
expressions.17 Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor states
believe that a state will not scruple to infringe copyrights
after Allen, which give authors overwhelming anxiety about
future copyright infringement by states.18 Lacking a robust
standing to sue, state copyright infringement may result in
irreparable economic and non-economic losses to authors,
which may harm innovation incentives.19 On the one hand,
according to Ex Parte Young,20 it is legally plausible for a
copyright owner to cure his or her irreparable economic
interests by suing for copyright infringement against a state
official for injunctive relief after Allen.21 However, it may not
be practical for most authors for efficiency reasons (i.e., high
litigation costs and litigation uncertainties).22 On the other

17. See, e.g., Bradford L. Smith & Susan O. Mann, Innovation and Intellectual
Property Protection in the Software Industry: An Emerging Role for Patents?, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 263 (2004) (discussing that the patent regime exchanges
limited monopoly rights for disclosure of innovation).
18. Id. at 242.
19. See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth,
32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 471, 474 (2000). But see Diane Leenheer Zimmerman,
Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 29 (2011) (criticizing the reward theory of copyrights and the effects of
monopoly on innovation incentives).
20. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
21. See Devin M. Jacobs & Gregory J. Krabacher, Copyrights and State
Sovereignty: U.S. Supreme Court Removes Monetary Damages for State Actor
Infringement, BRICKER (May 28, 2020), https://www.bricker.com/insightsresources/publications/copyrights-and-state-sovereignty-us-supreme-courtremoves-monetary-damages-for-state-actor-infringement.
22. See Jasper L. Tran & Cameron Baker, Allen v. Cooper: States Stay
Copyright Pirates, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ON THE DOCKET, 6 (forthcoming 2020).
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hand, courts rarely compensate for non-economic interests of
authors,23 reasoning that the nature of a utilitarian
copyright regime only repairs economic interests.24 However,
non-economic interests do matter to authors and motivate
them to sue under copyright law.25 For example, even though
the U.S. copyright regime does not broadly recognize the
moral rights of authors, there are some protections granting
narrow moral rights to authors, addressing a specific set of
non-economic interests.26 Even so, a problem arises when the
copyright offender is a state; the decision in Allen firmly puts
authors on the passive and defensive in negotiations with a
state offender.
Therefore, authors may have to compromise for practical
reasons. Worse than a compromise, they may merely give up
both asserting their copyrights and continuing producing
creative expressions.27 In responding to a study demanded
by the Copyright Office, the Copyright Alliance surveyed and
interviewed authors, or other copyright owners, who all
expressed discouragement of creating due to various
unpleasant experiences with government users of their
copyrighted works, including a direct excuse of state
sovereign immunity received from a state entity.28
By recognizing the hardships of authors to protect their
copyrights against a state and the potential negative

23. “Authors” in this Article refers to copyright owners. 17 U.S.C. § 201.
24. See, e.g., Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 744–45 (9th Cir. 2015).
25. See generally Andrew Gilden, Copyright’s Market Gibberish, 94 WASH. L.
REV. 1019 (2019).
26. See, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
27. See, e.g., Copyright Alliance, Sovereign Immunity Study: Comments of the
Copyright Alliance, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE 19, https://copyrightalliance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/11/Copyright-Alliance-Comments-Sovereign-ImmunityStudy-No.-2020-9.pdf (last visited Jan 13, 2021) (telling a story that a famous
author, Dr. Keith Bell, decided to stop writing after his unpleasant experience of
copyright enforcement with states).
28. See Madigan, supra note 8.
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consequences on innovation and creative expressions, this
Article proposes to adopt state apologies to cure copyright
owners hardships. State “apologies” in this proposal do not
mean express regrets but function to restore the reputation
of authors and their emotional distress. Congress and state
legislators can consider adding compelled state apologies in
statutes, repairing reputational or emotional harms to
copyright owners. State entities should also consider using
voluntary apologies to communicate with authors, heal their
emotional distress, and achieve a settlement, in which both
the public and authors are better off. Apologies consist of, at
least, dialogues established between the state entity and
copyright owners, and involve an explanation and a public
acknowledgment. Adding either compelled apologies through
legislation or offering voluntary apologies does not result in
more copyright litigations against state governments. These
two approaches are utilitarian,29 repairing or rebuilding the
relationships between the authority and authors to promote
settlement and innovation.
Part I of this Article discusses the hardships of private
parties in protecting their copyrights against a state before
and after Allen. Part II discusses how state actions under
sovereign immunity influence innovation. Part III raises the
proposal of adopting state apology for copyright infringement
by states and explains the proposal’s justification. Part IV
discusses the implications of this proposal. Finally, Part V
defends the proposal against probable obstacles.

29. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory,
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis
of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487
(1980); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technical Change, 68 OR.
L. REV. 275 (1989).
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HARDSHIPS IN PROTECTING COPYRIGHTS AGAINST
STATE OFFENDERS

Copyright owners face legal and practical hardships in
protecting their copyrights against a state. Allen30 does not
create new difficulties but only exposes an existing
hardship—state sovereign immunity. After Allen, it is
uncontroversial that this hardship is unable to be overcome
unless a state deprives copyright rights without due process.
This Part uses Allen as a benchmark and discusses the
economic and legal hardships for copyright owners in
protecting their copyrights against a state before and after
Allen.
A. Before Allen: Imbalanced Bargaining Power Between
Authors and States
Before the U.S. Supreme Court specifically addressed
state sovereign immunity in Allen,31 copyright owners had
many barriers to successfully suing a state for copyright
infringement and for corresponding adequate remedies.
Congress, and the CRCA, made filing lawsuits of copyright
infringement against a state and asking for remedies from
the state possible.32 However, the federal system’s legal
barriers—the fair-use doctrine and sovereign immunity—
prohibit copyright owners from suing and winning in federal
courts.33 Filing legal claims in state courts also cannot be
effective in protecting copyrights due to sovereign
immunity.34 In addition to the legal barriers, copyright
owners are also affected by economic reasons—high
litigation costs.35 The legal uncertainties caused by sovereign

30. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
31. Id.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 511.
33. See infra Part I.A.1.
34. See infra Part I.A.2.
35. See infra Part I.A.3.
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immunity and financial constraints on copyright owners put
states in a better bargaining position than copyright owners
in copyright infringement or licensing disputes.36 The
imbalanced bargaining power prevents authors or other
copyright owners from filing lawsuits against a state in any
court or insisting on litigation.
1. Legal Uncertainties Under the CRCA
The CRCA allows a private party to enforce copyrights
in federal courts against a state offender.37 However, before
the U.S. Supreme Court formally ruled it unconstitutional in
Allen,38 there had been legal uncertainties preventing a
private party from filing suits against a state for copyright
infringement. Two primary legal principles creating
uncertainties are the fair-use doctrine in copyright law39 and
state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.40
a. The Fair-Use Doctrine
The ultimate goal in protecting copyrights is to promote
the public good through promoting innovation and creative
expressions.41 The knowledge in an original creative work
can be used for education or by other creators in further

36. See Runhua Wang, New Private Law? Intellectual Property “Common-Law
Precedents” in China, 89 UMKC L. REV. 109, 153 (2021) (arguing that intellectual
property owners need robust property rights to obtain bargaining power against
infringers); see generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089 (providing the theoretical foundation for understanding the effects of a
court’s application of property and liability rules).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 511.
38. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
41. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good.”).
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innovation or creative expressions for free.42 The copyright
regime rewards artists or authors by giving them monopoly
rights for incentivizing innovation.43 However, the strength
and the scope of copyright protection is limited by the fairuse doctrine.44
The fair-use doctrine is a defense against a copyright
infringement claim.45 It narrows the scope of copyright
protection, excluding a non-commercial46 or transformative
use47 and “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, . . .,
scholarship, or research” from copyright infringement.48
Besides those excluded purposes, when making judgments,
courts should also consider the “nature of the copyrighted
work,”49 the amount of the copyrighted work contained in the
infringing use,50 and the infringing use’s effect on the value
of the copyrighted work (e.g., shrunk market size).51

42. Copyrights do not protect ideas but only protect original expressions of
ideas.
43. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450
(“The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort.”).
44. See id. at 450–51 (“[A] use that has no demonstrable effect upon the
potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited
in order to protect the author’s incentive to innovate and creatively express. The
prohibition of such noncommercial uses would merely inhibit access to ideas
without any countervailing benefit.”).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
46. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1269
(11th Cir. 2001) (evaluating commercial nature under Section 107).
47. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–81 (1994)
(ruling that a commercial parody may constitute a transformative use and,
therefore, a fair use).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
49. Id.
50. If the allegedly infringing work does not include a significant portion of
the copyrighted work, the use in the allegedly infringing work is permissible
under the de minimis use doctrine. See, e.g., Gordon v. Nextel Commc’ns, 345
F.3d 922, 924 (6th Cir. 2003); Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir.
2004) (suggesting that courts can measure the use under a quantitative or a
qualitative standard).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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While the fair-use doctrine is not frequently raised by
defendants in practice52 and has uncertainties when applied
in court,53 industries that benefit from copyrights worry
about it seriously when a defendant, or potential defendant,
is a state.54 This concern is not groundless. In an amicus
curiae brief submitted by legal scholars in support of the
state in Allen, they believe that North Carolina’s use is
trivial55 and does not harm, but benefits, Mr. Allen’s
economic interests.56 They argue the state’s use constitutes
“instant credibility for a private filmmaker,” adding value to
Mr. Allen and his works.57 Moreover, these scholars suggest
that North Carolina’s use educates the public about
history.58 Accordingly, they conclude that such use
constitutes a fair use and should be exempt from copyright
infringement or any liability.59
In practice, the fair-use defense is relatively robust when

52. See, e.g., Edward Lee, Fair Use Avoidance in Music Cases, 59 B.C.L. REV.
1873, 1900–01 (2018) (showing empirical evidence that there were rarely music
copyright cases including a fair-use defense or applying a fair-use defense
successfully).
53. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560
(1985) (“Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact.”).
54. Among the twenty-one amicus curiae briefs submitted to courts for Allen,
five supporting Mr. Allen expressed a concern about a relaxed application of the
fair-use doctrine when it is raised by the government. Brief of the Intellectual
Property Law Association of Chicago as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) (No. 18-877); Brief of the Copyright Alliance
and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, Allen, 140 S. Ct. 994 (No. 18-877); Brief of Amicus Curiae the
Software & Information Industry Association in Support of Petitioners, Allen,
140 S. Ct. 994 (no. 18-877); Brief of Ralph Oman as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Allen, 140 S. Ct. 994 (no. 18-877).
55. Brief of Professor Simone Rose as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 5-14, Allen, 140 S. Ct. 994 (no. 18-877).
56. Id. at 18–20.
57. Id. at 19.
58. Id. at 20–23.
59. Id. at 18–23.
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a case involves a state defendant.60 For example, in Jartech,
Inc. v. Clancy, both the jury and the appellate court found
that making abbreviated copies of obscene films by the local
City Council for use in nuisance abatement proceedings was
a fair use.61 In Association of American Medical Colleges v.
Cuomo, the court decided the State of New York’s request
and use of copyrighted exam materials for public records was
non-commercial and non-competing, but for education and
public interests, which should be a fair use.62 Nevertheless,
Judge Mahoney dissented that this decision waived the
State’s liabilities so broadly as to devastate the other
protectable parts of copyrights owned by private entities.63
In other words, when courts use the fair-use doctrine to
support state and public interests, the copyright protection
can be weakened excessively due to an overbroad scope.
b. Sovereign Immunity
Another issue that prevents private parties from
enforcing copyright interests against states in court is
sovereign immunity.64 State sovereign immunity is a
constitutional right of states under the Eleventh
Amendment, exempting them from being sued by private
parties in federal courts without their consent.65 Even
though the U.S. Supreme Court had not expressed its
attitude towards the Eleventh Amendment and whether

60. Brief of the Copyright Alliance and the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 54, at 20.
61. See Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 406–08 (1982).
62. See Ass’n of Am. Med. Colleges v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519, 524–26 (1991).
63. See id. at 527.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
65. See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Misunderstood Eleventh
Amendment, U. PENN. L. REV. 5 (forthcoming 2020) (interpreting the Eleventh
Amendment); see also OMAN, COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS,
COPYRIGHT LIABILITY OF STATES AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT xi (1988) (“The
CRS study reveals that none of the fifty states in their state constitution, state
laws, or state court decisions, expressly waives Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit for damages in federal court in copyright infringement cases.”).
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Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity under
the CRCA until Allen,66 private parties were unnerved in
enforcing copyrights against states by a presumption of state
sovereign immunity.67
Indeed, before Allen, it was questionable whether
Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity by the
CRCA.68 On the one hand, some scholars believe that the
answer is positive, so private parties can sue states in federal
courts for the federal question—copyright infringement.69
One the other hand, William Baude and Stephen Sachs
interpret the Eleventh Amendment as its plain meaning:
It strips the federal government of judicial power over one set of
cases: suits filed against states, in law or equity, by diverse
plaintiffs. It denies subject-matter jurisdiction in all such cases,
regardless of why and how the plaintiffs are in federal court, and it
does so in only such cases.70 In other words, state sovereign
immunity cannot be abrogated by Congress and its legislation, such
as the CRCA.71

Moreover, since Florida Prepaid,72 it has been tacit that
66. See Baude & Sachs, supra note 65, at 4 (criticizing that state courts are
waiting for the Supreme Court to interpret the scope of state sovereign
immunity).
67. See Letter from the Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier & Hon. Carlos
Moorhead, Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Justice, to Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights (Aug. 3, 1987); see also Brief of
the American Society of Media Photographers, Inc., and the National Press
Photographers Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Joined by
The North American Nature Photography Association et al. at 13–14, Allen v.
Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) (No. 18-877) (arguing that the government
defendant may assert State sovereign immunity or lawyers may decline to
litigate for State sovereign immunity).
68. See generally KIRK D. NEMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WAIVER OF
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY FROM SUIT: STATE SURVEY RELATING TO
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS (1988) (showing the diverse attitudes of States
to waiving their sovereign immunity).
69. See, e.g., Mills Music, Inc. v. Ariz., 591 F.2d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1979).
70. Baude & Sachs, supra note 65, at 4 (“The Eleventh Amendment means
what it says.”).
71. Id. at 12.
72. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
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the CRCA regarding copyright protection is very likely
unconstitutional and fails in abrogating state sovereign
immunity.73 In Florida Prepaid, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that the Patent Remedy Act74 was unconstitutional for
allowing private parties to sue a state for patent
infringement if due process was satisfied.75 A private party
generally cannot sue a state for monetary damages in federal
courts,76 especially after Florida Prepaid.77
Companies complain that states use the uncertainties of
state sovereign immunity to threaten companies to
compromise for an unfair settlement. For example, Dow
Jones defines itself as a “victim” of an abuse of sovereign
immunity after copyright infringement.78 The California
Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”), a
California state agency, published over 10,000 copyrighted
materials from Dow Jones’ publications, such as the Wall
Street Journal.79 These publications require an enormous
cost spent by Dow Jones in collecting material to originate
them,80 so they are reluctant to license the copyrighted
publications without fair license fees to offset that cost.81

73. See Feller, supra note 11.
74. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992).
75. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 648 (1999) (concluding that Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution does
not give Congress the power to abrogate State sovereign immunity).
76. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 204 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
77. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 633.
78. Brief for Amicus Curiae Dow Jones & Company, Inc. in Support of
Petitioners at 4, Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) (No. 18-877).
79. See id.; see also Yves Smith, CalPERS Internal News Site Ignores
Unfavorable Stories, Steals Copyrighted Material, NAKED CAPITALISM (June 9,
2017),
https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2017/06/calpers-internal-news-siteignores-unfavorable-stories-steals-copyrighted-material.html.
80. Brief for Amicus Curiae Dow Jones & Company, Inc. in Support of
Petitioners, supra note 78, at 5.
81. Id. at 6 (“At the time Dow Jones learned of the ongoing CalPERS
infringements, the Dow Jones reprint price schedule stipulated a fee of $360 for
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However, when Dow Jones tried to enforce copyrights
against CalPERS, CalPERS asserted no liability for its use
and publication because of the exemption under sovereign
immunity.82 In another similar copyright infringement case,
where CalPERS successfully asserted sovereign immunity in
a federal district court,83 Dow Jones ultimately accepted a
“low-seven-figure settlement” in its copyright enforcement
action against CalPERS.84
2. Ineffective State Law
A copyright owner may sue a state in a state court.85
Some legal professionals suggest that copyright owners file
lawsuits against state offenders in state courts under state
copyright law.86 However, such a suggestion cannot be an
effective solution for most copyright owners, who are

the right to reproduce a single fill-text [The Wall Street Journal] Article in a onetime email to 200 recipients, and a fee of $1,900 to display a single full-text
Journal article on a publicly accessible website for one year.”); see also Smith,
supra note 79 (“[The price of a site license] would be over $100,000.”).
82. Brief for Amicus Curiae Dow Jones & Company, Inc. in Support of
Petitioners, supra note 78, at 8.
83. See id.; Arya v. CalPERS, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1072 (E.D. Cal. 2013).
84. Brief for Amicus Curiae Dow Jones & Company, Inc. in Support of
Petitioners, supra note 78, at 8.
85. See Curran v. Ark., 56 U.S. 304, 309 (1853) (believing that the 11th
Amendment consents individuals to sue the government in state courts). But see
NEMER, supra note 68, at CRS-21 (“The Attorney General [of Texas] concluded
that the Eleventh Amendment would bar any damage action in federal court
against the State, and to sue the State of Texas in state court would require
permission to sue to be granted by the legislature.”).
86. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Law Briefing: Florida Prepaid and
Infringement
by
State
Actors,
FINDLAW
(Mar.
26,
2008),
https://corporate.findlaw.com/law-library/intellectual-property-law-briefingflorida-prepaid-and.html (suggesting patentees to sue states under state-law
cause of actions after Fla Prepaid); Eric Goldman, U.S. Supreme Court Confirms
that States Have Sovereign Immunity from Copyright Infringement Suits–Allen
TECH.
&
MKTG.
L.
BLOG
(Apr.
13,
2020),
v.
Cooper,
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/04/u-s-supreme-court-confirms-thatstates-have-sovereign-immunity-from-copyright-infringement-suits-allen-vcooper.htm (suggesting copyright owners can learn from patentees to use the
state-law regime).
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reluctant to sue under this approach.87
First, copyright owners worry that they may not sue a
state successfully in a state court, even though worries about
partiality against private parties by state courts in copyright
infringement cases have not been observed in practice.88 The
primary barrier for copyright owners is less “judicial
activism,”89 but more state sovereign immunity. For
example, in Texas, private parties still need permission from
the state legislature to sue the state for copyright
infringement in a state court.90 Moreover, state courts have
also frequently rejected the enforcement of copyrights
against a state based on sovereign immunity.91
Second, it is systematically ineffective for copyright
owners to use or rely on state legal systems for copyright
protection.92 In state courts, copyright owners can sue state
entities under common law doctrines, such as takings93 and
87. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 15, at 2 (“Through an analysis of the
published case law and a survey of the states, we identified 58 lawsuits that had
been active since January 1985 in either a state or federal court in which a state
was a defendant in an action involving the unauthorized use of intellectual
property. The federal courts—which have exclusive jurisdiction over patent and
copyright infringement cases—heard 47 of these cases in which the state was a
defendant . . . .”).
88. See Brief of the Recording Industry Association of America et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3, Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) (No.
18-877).
89. “Judicial activism” suggests that a court “applies law departing from the
text of the law for political or policy reasons.” Runhua Wang, Decoding Judicial
Reasoning in China: A Comparative Empirical Analysis of Guiding Cases, 68
CLEV. STATE L. REV. 521, 574 n.287 (2020).
90. NEMER, supra note 68, at CRS-21.
91. Brief of the American Society of Media Photographers, Inc., and the
National Press Photographers Association as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Joined by The North American Nature Photography Association et
al., supra note 67, at 14 (“Countless cases have been summarily dismissed in both
federal and state courts due to an incorrect interpretation of the CRCA and
exercise of sovereign immunity.”).
92. See, e.g., Brief for the Recording Industry Association of America et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 88, at 3.
93. See Brief of the American Society of Media Photographers, Inc., and the
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breach of contract,94 or state copyright law.95 However, there
are material difficulties for copyright owners to rely on these
approaches. One critical reason is that the law is inconsistent
between states. For example, with respect to state copyright
law, while many international treaties put efforts on
copyright law harmonization and are joined by the United
States,96 Tim Wu believes no efforts have been made by the
U.S. Supreme Court in harmonizing state copyright laws
under those international treaties.97 Marketa Trimble also
argues that “State IP statutes typically neither mention nor
refer to international treaties on IP.”98 She blames the
failure of the rise of state copyright law on the Supremacy
Clause99 and the dormant Commerce Clause,100 which limit
state legislation on copyright issues.101 In practice, copyright
owners rarely file state law claims in courts, as shown in
Christopher Cotropia and James Gibson’s empirical
evidence.102
National Press Photographers Association as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Joined by The North American Nature Photography Association et
al., supra note 67, at 12 (citing Romero v. California Dep’t of Transp., No. CV 088047, 2009 WL 650629 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2009) (parallelly listing takings
of copyrights and remedies of copyright infringement).
94. See Brief of Oracle America, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 12–17, Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) (No. 18-877)
(complaining that Oregon escaped its contract liabilities to Oracle in copyright
licenses); see also U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 15, at 22 tbl. 2.
95. See Marketa Trimble, US State Copyright Laws: Challenge and Potential,
20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 66, 67 (2017) (“Copyright law in the United States falls
primarily in the domain of federal law; however, individual U.S. states . . . do
have state laws that concern copyright.”).
96. E.g., Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568,
102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
97. Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 585 (2007) (“[The Supreme
Court] makes no effort to reconcile inconsistent State law and pays no special
attention to State interpretation of a treaty.”).
98. Trimble, supra note 95, at 81.
99. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
101. See Trimble, supra note 95, at 73–79.
102. See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, Copyright’s Topography: An
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Besides the ineffectiveness of state copyright regimes in
copyright protection for these problems, when the offender is
a state entity, sovereign immunity further aggravates the
uncertainty and inconsistency. State entities or legislatures
can waive sovereign immunity and then sit in court as a
defendant.103 However, states are not consistent with the
determination of a valid waiver, which is made under state
law.104 In Kirk Nemer’s survey report, some state
constitutions entirely restrict state entities to be sued in
state courts.105 There are also states where waivers are
unconstitutional,106 such as Alabama107 and West
Virginia.108 In these states, private parties cannot sue the
states for copyright infringement regardless of their state
copyright laws.
3. Litigation Cost
Plaintiffs are cost-sensitive.109 Copyright owners seek
statutory damages to cover their losses in copyright
infringement and litigation.110 Furthermore, by observing
copyright lawsuits and the damages awarded by juries,
Samuelson and Wheatland argue that copyright owners seek
Empirical Study of Copyright Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1981, 1997 (2014) (“State
infringement claims accompanied federal claims in less than 2% of cases, and
state infringement claims stood on their own even more rarely—roughly 1 in
every 400 cases.”).
103. NEMER, supra note 68, at abstract.
104. Id. at CRS-1, CRS-2.
105. Id. at CRS-2; see also, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20 (“The State of Arkansas
shall never be made defendant in any of her courts.”).
106. See NEMER, supra note 68, at CRS-2.
107. See Aland v. Graham, 250 So. 2d 677, 681 (Ala. 1987) (“[N]o individual
has authority to waive this immunity.”).
108. See Mellon-Stuart Co. v. Hall, 359 S.E.2d 124, 129 (W. Va. 1987) (“This
constitutional grant of immunity is absolute and, as we have consistently held,
cannot be waived by the legislature or any other instrumentality of the State.”).
109. This is a premise of rational people.
110. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 102, at 1999 (showing empirical
evidence that most copyright-related cases seek statutory damages including
actual damages and enhanced statutory damages).
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grossly excessive damages.111 By contrast, most copyright
litigations have been settled before trial or judgment.112
Before filing a lawsuit regarding copyright infringement
against a state, however, many copyright owners have been
scared away by the prospect of high litigation costs without
adequate, or even any, recovery.113 They also bear risks to
repay the state defendants’ litigation costs if they lose.114
Even large companies may settle with a state because of high
litigation costs. For example, Oracle was forced to settle its
copyright disputes against the State of Oregon because of
litigation cost concerns.115 In addition, Dow Jones was forced
to settle with CalPERS after balancing the probability of
receiving full recovery and the high litigation cost.116
However, such settlement agreements may not effectively
compensate copyright owners because their copyrights may

111. Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright
Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 443 (2009).
112. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 102, at 1999 (showing a voluntary
termination rate of 80.16%); see also Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities
Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1954–55 (2009) (showing a settlement rate
of approximately 67.7%).
113. See, e.g., Brief for the Recording Industry Association of America et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 88, at 9 (“[T]he copyright
owner decided not to file suit upon learning that state sovereign immunity barred
any monetary recovery (including costs or attorneys’ fees) from the infringer.”);
see also Mitchell N. Berman et al., State Accountability for Violations of
Intellectual Property Rights: How to “Fix” Florida Prepaid (and How Not to), 79
TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1094 (2001) (explaining that lost profits, attorney’s fees, and
punitive damages are not available in takings claims against states).
114. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Software & Information Industry
Association in Support of Petitioners, supra note 54, at 22 (“[I]f a copyright owner
files a baseless suit, and loses, a state may seek its attorneys’ fees and costs when
it prevails.”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976).
115. See Brief of Oracle America, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, supra note 94, at 17 (“The state and federal cases ultimately settled
while pending on appeal. But they forced Oracle to devote years and substantial
resources to the lawsuit, far more time than should have been necessary for this
straightforward case.”).
116. Id. at 8.
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be “void and unenforceable” under state legislations.117
These companies (e.g., Oracle and Dow Jones) are left bitter
after their settlements.118 Small companies are left in an
even worse condition than large companies, as they may not
even have a chance to negotiate with a state offender due to
financial constraints.119
B. The Unconstitutional CRCA Under Allen
In March 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered its
decision in Allen, clearly ruling that the CRCA is
unconstitutional and invalid.120 Frederick Allen owns the
copyrights on some videos and photos of the shipwreck of the
Queen Anne’s Revenge and its recovery.121 The State of
North Carolina, which owns the shipwreck and paid for the
recovery, impermissibly posted some of Mr. Allen’s
copyrighted videos and photos online, promoting tourism.122
Mr. Allen sued the State for copyright infringement under
the CRCA and claimed that the CRCA abrogated the State’s
sovereign immunity. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court
117. See id. at 26 (“[North Carolina] state legislation even expressly stated that
the prior settlement agreement was supposedly ‘void and unenforceable.’”).
118. See generally id.; Brief for Dow Jones & Company, Inc. as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners, supra note 78.
119. Brief of Oracle America, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
supra note 94, at 3 (“For many small software companies such as start-ups and
solo-practicing developers, it is impossible to negotiate waivers because they lack
sufficient leverage to pressure a state to agree.”). After receiving concerns
regarding copyright infringement, state entities usually do not respond to the
concerns at all or properly, as the California survey shows. Comments of
Copyright Alliance, supra note 27, at 12 (finding that most copyright owners
complain government entities ignored their concerns about copyright
infringement, refused to recognize their copyrights, or invoked state sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment).
120. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (2020) (“[The CARC] is invalid under
[Section Five of the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution].”).
121. Id. at 999.
122. Richard Wolf, Ahoy! Supreme Court Protects States from Copyright
Lawsuits in Blackbeard Pirate Ship Case, USA TODAY (Mar. 23, 2020, 2:23 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/03/23/supreme-courtpirated-video-photos-blackbeard-pirate-ship/4862817002.
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First, under Allen, Article I, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution—or, rather, Congress using its power
authorized by Article I, Section 8—cannot abrogate state
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.123
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution contains the IP
Clause, which grants Congress the enumerated power “to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries.”124 This IP
Clause gives Congress legislative power to promulgate IP
statutes for promoting innovation.125 However, when a
copyright offender is a state entity, the scope of enforcing
power under federal statute against the state entity is
constrained by the Eleventh Amendment.126 The CRCA,
which was promulgated by Congress under the authorization
of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, broadly
abolishes state sovereign immunity from copyright lawsuits,
and thus conflicts with the Eleventh Amendment.127
Therefore, it is invalid and unconstitutional.128
Second, copyright owners can seek protection against a
state if the state unconstitutionally infringes their
copyrights, as explained in Allen.129 Unconstitutional
copyright infringement refers to intentional infringement
without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.130
123. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1001.
124. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
125. See Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1001.
126. See id. at 999, 1003.
127. See id. at 999.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 1006.
130. See id. at 1005 (citing Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642–43 (1999)).
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According to the Eleventh Amendment, Congress or federal
power can strip state sovereign immunity only if the
Fourteenth Amendment is violated.131 Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from taking
private property without due process.132 The U.S. Supreme
Court recognizes that IP rights are property rights, in this
context.133 Therefore, copyright owners can only seek
remedies for copyright infringement by states, when the
state’s infringement was made without due process.134 This
scope is narrower than the text contained in the CRCA.135
Third, the U.S. Supreme Court believes that its holding
in Allen is consistent with Florida Prepaid.136 Florida
Prepaid deals with the issue of patent infringement by
states137 and should not be overruled.138 It rules that the
Patent Remedy Act is unconstitutional because it governs
both intentional and state patent infringements where no
violation of due process has occurred, and also
indiscriminately abolishes state sovereign immunity in such
cases.139 The constitutional foundation for both the Patent
Remedy Act and the CRCA is the IP Clause.140 The CRCA
and Patent Remedy Act share an identical “indiscriminate
131. See id. at 1003.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 1004 (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 128 (1932))
(“Copyrights are a form of property.”).
134. See id.
135. See id. (“For an abrogation statute to be ‘appropriate’ under Section 5, it
must be tailored to ‘remedy or prevent’ conduct infringing the Fourteenth
Amendment’s substantive prohibitions.” (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 519 (1997))).
136. Id. at 999; Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
137. See generally Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. 627.
138. See Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1003.
139. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647.
140. See id. at 646 (“[T]he provisions of the Patent Remedy Act are ‘so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that [they] cannot be
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.’”).
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scope,” “too ‘out of proportion’ to any due process problem” to
defeat sovereign immunity concerns.141 Accordingly, the U.S.
Supreme Court did not distinguish between patents and
copyrights. It ruled consistently in holding that the CRCA
was invalid and unconstitutional, utilizing the same
reasoning that was used in Florida Prepaid addressing the
Patent Remedy Act.142
C. Copyright Protection After Allen
Copyright protection from state infringement after Allen
is clear on two points, but the two are both ineffective in
practice. First, it is agreed that private parties can rely on
the federal system for filing claims of copyright infringement
against states with states’ express consent to sit in a federal
court or waiver of sovereign immunity.143 However, recalling
the industry’s complaints,144 Nemer’s fifty-state survey,145
and the CA’s 2020 survey,146 it is always difficult for private
parties to acquire such an express consent or a waiver from
states. Beyond acquiring an express consent or a waiver,
there is still the potential that the state entity refuses to
enforce the waiver,147 or the state legislature prohibits the
enforcement.148 Second, Allen does not prevent private
141. See Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1005–06.
142. See id. at 1001–02.
143. See, e.g., Tom Kulik, States’ Rights Revenge? 3 Key Takeaways from
SCOTUS Ruling in Allen v. Cooper, ABOVE THE LAW (Mar. 30, 2020, 5:01 PM),
https://abovethelaw.com/2020/03/states-rights-revenge-3-key-takeaways-fromscotus-ruling-in-allen-v-cooper.
144. See Brief for Oracle America, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, supra note 94, at 3 (complaining that a waiver in licensing
agreements is illusory in practice).
145. See NEMER, supra note 68, at CRS-2.
146. Copyright Alliance, supra note 27, at 12 (complaining that government
entities hardly respond seriously to the concerns raised by copyright owners).
147. See Brief for Oracle America, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, supra note 94, at 3.
148. NEMER, supra note 68, at CRS-21. The State of Alabama is not authorized
to waive the immunity without consent from the legislature. Aland v. Graham,
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parties from filing copyright infringement lawsuits in state
courts.149 However, the state legislature may completely
prohibit litigations against the state,150 and the state
copyright protection can be ineffective.151
Whether private parties can sue a state for copyright
infringement in federal courts without the state’s express
consent after Allen is controversial among legal
professionals. Some legal practitioners superficially explain
the case as that states cannot be sued without their
consent.152 Alternatively, some legal practitioners did not
distinguish between monetary damages and other types of
remedies, such as injunctive relief.153 Instead, they
superficially suggest that private parties cannot seek
monetary damages from states for copyright infringement in
federal courts.154 Private parties can still sue state offenders
for a declaratory judgment, an injunction, or other
remedies.155
250 So. 2d 677, 681 (Ala. 1971).
149. Justin A. MacLean & Michael R. Friedman, Allen v. Cooper and Georgia
v. Public.Resource.org: The Supreme Court Navigates the Relationship Between
State Government and Federal Copyright Law, GREEBERG TRAURIG (May 05,
2020), https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2020/5/allen-v-cooper-and-georgia-vpublic-resource-org-supreme-court-state-federal-copyright-law.
150. See, e.g., NEMER, supra note 68, at CRS-5. (listing the State of Arkansas’s
constitution that prohibits suits against the state both in state courts and federal
courts). ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20.
151. Supra Part I.A.2.
152. Kevin Milewski, Supreme Court Rules That States Cannot be Sued for
Copyright Infringement, For Now…, PROSKAUER (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2020/03/24/supreme-court-rules-thatstates-cannot-be-sued-for-copyright-infringement-for-now/#page=1.
153. See Brian D. Wassom, Supreme Court Gives a Pass to State-Sanctioned
Piracy of Media Copyrights, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/communications_law/mediabar/piracy.
154. Id.
155. E.g., Leon Bass & Kristin Hardy, Did the Supreme Court Just Give States
License to Pirate Copyrights? Protecting Copyrights Post Allen, TAFT (Apr. 13,
2020),
https://www.taftlaw.com/news-events/law-bulletins/did-the-supremecourt-just-give-states-license-to-pirate-copyrights-protecting-copyrights-postallen; Kulik, supra note 143; Mark H. Wittow et al., U.S. Supreme Court Holds
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Indeed, the invalidation of the CRCA by the U.S.
Supreme Court does not suggest that the Court entirely
prohibits remedies for copyright owners from a state.156 Allen
functions to instruct Congress to correct its unconstitutional
text in the CRCA to be tailored to govern unconstitutional
copyright infringements by a state.157 The constitutional
rights of states—sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment—does not abolish people’s constitutional
rights—due process and property rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment.158
Many public universities, public libraries, and scholars
believe that the invalidation of the CRCA does not create
shameless state copyright offenders.159 Public libraries argue
that they actively comply with copyright law and conduct
copyright protection, even though their conduct is very likely

Copyright Remedy Classification Act of 1990 Does Not Abrogate State Sovereign
Immunity for Copyright Infringement: Allen v. Cooper, THE NATIONAL L. REV.
(March 25, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/us-supreme-courtholds-copyright-remedy-classification-act-1990-does-not-abrogate.
156. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1006 (2020) (“[This decision] need not
prevent Congress from passing a valid copyright abrogation law in the future.”).
157. Id. at 1004 (“For an abrogation statute to be ‘appropriate’ under Section
5, it must be tailored to ‘remedy or prevent’ conduct infringing the Fourteenth
Amendment’s substantive prohibitions.” (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.
S. 507, 519 (1997))).
158. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 181–82 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
see also Jeffrey W. Childers, State Sovereign Immunity and the Protection of
Intellectual Property: Do Recent Congressional Attempts to Level the Playing Field
Run Afoul of Current Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence and Other
Constitutional Doctrines, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1067, 1102 (2004) (partially supporting
the constitutional Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003);
Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003, S. 1191, 108th Cong. § 5
(2003) (“Imposes liability on States for violations of the fifth or fourteenth
amendment of the U.S. Constitution (takings or due process violations) involving
intellectual property under such Federal laws.”).
159. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, at 18,
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020); see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645 (“[T]he evidence before
Congress suggested that most state infringement was innocent or at worst
negligent.”)
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protected under the fair-use doctrine.160 Public universities
argue that they do not intentionally infringe copyrights
because they are in the education industry valuing ethics
and reputation, and their employees are also creators who
value copyright ownership.161 Even the State of North
Carolina tried to settle with Mr. Allen by paying him $15,000
and laying out his respective rights to the copyrighted
materials.162
Due to the barriers of sovereign immunity, copyright
owners may still seek remedies for copyright infringement by
states in alternative approaches after Allen. First, they can
seek injunctive relief against state officials.163 An injunction
can prevent government officials from continuing to
impermissibly use their copyrighted work.164 Second, Allen
also does not prohibit them from seeking monetary damages
from government officials who infringe copyrights.165 Third,
private parties have a constitutional right to bring due
process or takings claims against states for copyright
infringement. However, even though copyright owners can
establish the existence of property by copyright, when
raising a claim under the Takings Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the property owner must prove that the
160. Brief of Amici Curiae American Library Association et al. in Support of
Respondents, at 7, Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) (“[L]ibraries at state
colleges and universities play a central role in educating faculty and students
concerning compliance with copyright law.”).
161. See Brief of Association of Public and Land-grant Universities and
Association of American Universities as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents
at 9–10, Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020); see also Alissa Centivany, Paper
Tigers: Rethinking the Relationship Between Copyright and Scholarly Publishing,
17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 385 385, 409–10 (2011) (discussing facultycreators care about ownership of copyrights).
162. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 999 (2020).
163. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 123.
164. Bass & Hardy, supra note 155.
165. See Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty,
Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 525
(2003) (suggesting people to sue federal government officials rather than the
federal government for constitutional restrictions).
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property’s full value has been deprived by a state;166 this is
difficult to prove in copyright infringement.167 Obviously,
none of these approaches can properly compensate copyright
owners.168
With this framework in place, how can copyright owners
effectively protect their copyrights against state copyright
offenders, receive adequate compensation, and retain
innovation incentives without a new, constitutional,
CRCA?169 Rational copyright owners may not sue due to high
litigation expenses and a massive amount of time for merely
an injunction, which cannot adequately redress their loss.170
The result of Allen seems economically efficient; it decreases
litigation numbers and encourages settlements because
copyright owners have become more hesitant to sue a state
166. See Janice D. Paster, Money Damages for Regulatory Takings, 23 NAT.
RES. J. 711, 715 (1983) (“The property owner could seek compensation when the
taking was an absolute conversion, an infliction of permanent injury, or the
destruction of value.”).
167. See, e.g., Univ. Hous. Sys. v. Jim Olive Photography, 580 S.W.3d 360, 375–
77 (Tex. App. 2019) (ruling that an alleged copyright infringement by a state
entity does not constitute a taking because the copyright owner does not lose the
right to use or license his copyrighted work and the alleged infringement by the
state entity only costs the copyright owner a licensing fee).
168. A declaratory judgment of a state’s copyright infringement is meaningless
to copyright owners who spend high costs to develop their works. See, e.g., Allen
v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 999 (2020) (showing a that plaintiff seeks monetary
damages); see also Brief for Dow Jones & Company, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, supra note 78, at 5 (complaining about the high costs to
develop the copyrighted information); Copyright Alliance, Sovereign Immunity
Study Reply Comments, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE, https://copyrightalliance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/10/Copyright-Alliance-Reply-Comments-SovereignImmunity-Study-1.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) (delivering complaints by
copyright owners that injunctions “do nothing to compensate for the harm caused,
and do little to deter against future infringement”).
169. Without a valid new CRCA, copyright owners lack a direct legal base for
suing states in federal courts for copyright infringement without consent from
states. Congress has not cured the unconstitutional Patent Remedy Act since the
Supreme Court’s 1999 holding in Florida Prepaid. See Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (ruling
the Patent Remedy Act unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment).
170. See Wang, supra note 89, at 549 (defining that rational people attempt to
maximize their wealth or money).
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after Allen. This increased efficiency is caused by a decrease
of copyright owners’ bargaining power in their settlement
agreements with a state, against the expectations of the
industry and authors.171 Forcing copyright owners to settle
with a state, and receive low compensation in return for the
state’s use, extends the scope of compulsory licenses,172
which may harm their innovation incentives.173
II. ALLEN’S CONTROVERSIAL EFFECTS ON INNOVATION
People maintain a variety of human rights over
copyrights and copyrighted works, depending on the groups
in which they belong. Authors value the property and moral
rights of copyrights. “Knowledge receivers” value the right to
access knowledge in the copyrighted works and participate
in arts or cultural activities. The copyright regime is left to
balance between the interests of the two groups for
education, knowledge spillover, and promoting innovation.174
However, the copyright regime has not addressed many noneconomic interests of authors.175 Allen worsens the ignorance
of those interests but secures litigation efficiency, despite
that the decision in Allen explains a fundamental
constitutional question.176 This Part explains the economic
and non-economic interests of the public and authors and
pierces Allen’s paradox.

171. See, e.g., Brief of Oracle America, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, supra note 94, at 3.
172. E.g., 17 U.S.C § 115 (defining the scope of exclusive rights in nondramatic
musical works).
173. Wang, supra note 36, at 148 (criticizing the premise of compulsory licenses
which conflicts with the economic rationale of IP law to promote innovation).
174. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 609 (1962).
175. See generally Gilden, supra note 25, at 1020–21 (explaining rightsholders
may be motivated by family privacy, sexual autonomy, reputation, or well-being).
176. See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
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A. Public Knowledge and the Public’s Access Right
It is widely recognized that people have human rights to
access knowledge and innovate.177 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) defines two human
rights that interact with copyrights—the rights of access and
participation.178 The human rights embedded in copyrights
are indeed more developed in Europe than the U.S.179
However, while the U.S. has not signed the UDHR, the
utilitarian copyright law in the U.S. does not conflict with
these two human rights defined in the UDHR. By contrast,
those two human rights in the utilitarian copyright regime
are reflected in its goal to support social development.180
The ultimate goal of establishing the copyright regime in
the U.S. is to make knowledge available to the public and
promote innovation.181 Society demands knowledge,
especially creative knowledge for development. Knowledge
receivers can use publicly available knowledge in their
creative expressions and become innovative-information
providers to receive rewards from the legal regime and the

177. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at art. 27(1)
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (“Everyone has the right freely to participate
in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific
advancement and its benefits.”).
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors’ Rights-Based Copyright Law:
The Fairness and Morality of French and American Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L. J. 549, 551–52 (2006) (comparing the protection of human rights
of copyright authors in the U.S. and France).
180. See Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 3 INTELL.
PROP. Q. 349, 358 (1999) (suggesting that the right to development is a human
right and IP does not conflict with human rights if IP can promote development);
see Henry E. Smith, IP and the New Private Law, 30 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 6
(2017).
181. This the foundation of the discussions about building and optimizing IP
regimes in the literature. See Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge
Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L. J. 804,
832–39 (2008) (reviewing the literature on exploring a balance between public
and private interest in the design of IP regimes).
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market.182 However, it is also possible for people to merely
receive knowledge or information and not contribute any new
knowledge to society. These demands by knowledge receivers
are suggestive of their right to access knowledge and
participate in arts.
Compared to other types of IP rights (i.e., patents,
trademarks, trade secrets), copyrights and copyright
protection concern the public interest the most. In the 18th
and early 19th centuries, the U.S. enforced copyrights
weakly and allowed the public to access knowledge for at a
low price or even for free.183 Even though private parties
bargained for strong property interests in the legislation of
the 1976 General Revision of Copyright Law,184 the copyright
regime maintains its purpose to “promote uncompensated
positive externalities” for the public good.185 For example,
some use of copyrights for educational purposes constitutes
public interests, supported by the copyright regime.186
Similarly, 17 U.S.C. § 108 exempts some non-commercial
activities by public libraries and archives for public interests
to support research or public education.187
Therefore, within a copyright regime in which free

182. See Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It
the Best Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 62
(2002).
183. See LAWRENCE W. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 187–88 (3rd ed.
2005).
184. See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative
History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987).
185. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1031, 1052 (2004).
186. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
187. Id. § 108 (excluding some non-commercial use of arts by a library or
archives from copyright infringement “if (1) the reproduction or distribution is
made without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage; (2) the
collections of the library or archives are (i) open to the public, or (ii) available not
only to researchers affiliated with the library or archives or with the institution
of which it is a part, but also to other persons doing research in a specialized
field.”).
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ridings can be leniently tolerated, it is not surprising that the
public authorizes “pirates” for the public welfare.188 By their
“piracy,” public authorities bridge knowledge and the public
at a low cost but high effectiveness and efficiency.
Specifically, public universities need to sustain educational
resources for teaching and research189 because they bear
heavy duties to educate students and the public190 and also
engage in innovation.191 Public libraries provide various
databases to effectively and efficiently detect research
sources or inspire readers to research new areas.192
Moreover, sovereign immunity can shield state entities,
especially public universities, from copyright litigation,
when they serve the public good.193 Before Allen,194 Peter
Menell suggested that an educational use of copyrights by a
state should be immune from copyright infringement
litigation.195 For similar reasons, the Association of Public
188. Wang, supra note 36, at 119.
189. See Brief of Association of Public and Land-grant Universities and
Association of American Universities as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
supra note 161, at 2 (expressing concerns that expensive copyright litigations
divert scarce resources owned by universities that should be used in education
and research).
190. THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS & SCIENCES, PUBLIC RESEARCH
UNIVERSITIES: SERVING THE PUBLIC GOOD 2 (2016) (“Public research universities
educate about 20 percent of all students nationwide; among the nation’s research
universities, they award 65 percent of all master’s degrees and 68 percent of all
research doctorate degrees. They enroll 3.8 million students, including almost
900,000 graduate students, annually.”).
191. See Shubha Ghosh, Are Universities Special?, 49 AKRON L. REV. 671, 674
(2016).
192. Brief of Amici Curiae American Library Association et al. in Support of
Respondents, supra note 160, at 23; see also Matthew Sag, The New Legal Landscape for Text Mining and Machine Learning, 66 J. COPYR. SOC’Y. USA 291, 350
(2019); Michael W. Carroll, Copyright and the Progress of Science: Why Text and
Data Mining is Lawful, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893 (2019).
193. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997) (ruling that
state universities are immune from monetary damages according to the Eleventh
Amendment).
194. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
195. Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from
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and Land-grant Universities, a non-profit organization
relating to research and education, submitted an amicus
curiae brief to the U.S. Supreme Court showing its strong
interests that sovereign immunity should be upheld for
promoting research, innovation, and education in public
universities.196 However, both the public interest concerns
benefiting the demand side of knowledge by the copyright
regime and the Eleventh Amendment may harm the supply
side of knowledge from artists and authors.
B. Economic Incentives for Copyright Owners
To explain how IP regimes promote innovation and
creative expressions, the conventional reward theory197 and
the controversial prospect theory198 apply to authors who are
interested in protecting their innovative outcomes in the
forms of patents or copyrights. Under the reward theory,
when expressing and contributing creative information to
the public, innovative-work providers are rewarded with
limited exclusive rights and expect compensation from the
market and society directly.199 With these exclusive rights,
they ask for enough compensation from the market for using
or commercializing the original creative works, secured by
patents or copyrights, to offset their investment in producing

Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399,
1407–08 (2000).
196. See Brief of Association of Public and Land-grant Universities and
Association of American Universities as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
supra note 161, at 1–2.
197. See Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards versus Intellectual
Property Rights, 44 J. L. & ECON. 525, 529–30 (2001) (retesting the robustness of
the reward theory).
198. See generally Edmund W Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J. L. & ECON. 265 (1977) (raising out the prospect theory); cf. John F.
Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 13 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (1996)
(challenging the prospect theory).
199. See Zimmerman, supra note 19, at 31 (introducing classical rationale of
copyrights to encourage creative works).
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the works and continue to innovate.200 They also expect
investors to be signaled by the IP rights and attracted to
invest in their business.201 Under the prospect theory
suggested by Edmund Kitch, which supplements rather than
conflicts with the reward theory, the rewards or
compensation can be realized through follow-on authors,
artists, or innovators because of the exclusive rights.202
With respect to the economic incentives demanded by
authors and encouraged by the IP Clause,203 the copyright
regime cannot supply enough incentive for innovation or
creatively expression. First, commercializing copyrighted
works or copyrights needs strong support from private law,
securing transactions.204 However, property law and private
property rights are opposite to the copyright regime’s goal of
promoting “uncompensated positive externalities.”205 The
economic rationale is that the social surplus exceeding
rewards for authors decreases their incentives to innovate or
creatively express.206 A weakness of relying on private law is
that it does not embrace disputes against states.207
Moreover, states may not actually infringe but may pay to
use copyrighted works under licenses negotiated under their
stronger bargaining power. However, the payment may not
200. Menell, supra note 195, at 1416; see also Shavell & Ypersele, supra note
197, at 529.
201. The literature explains that IP rights have signal effects to attract
investors showing the competitiveness and the potential of a company and also
give them the confidence to be paid back with the intangible property rights if
the business fails. See CAROLIN HÄUSSLER ET AL., TO BE FINANCED OR NOT… - THE
ROLE OF PATENTS FOR VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING (2009); Clarisa Long, Patent
Signals, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 646 (2002).
202. See Kitch, supra note 198, at 275–80.
203. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
204. See Smith, supra note 180, at 3.
205. See Lemley, supra note 185, at 1048 (“Tangible property law also
implicitly rejects the idea that owners are entitled to capture all positive
externalities.”).
206. Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 197, at 530.
207. See Smith, supra note 180, at 3.
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adequately compensate copyright owners and cannot
incentivize them to innovate. Suzanne Scotchmer explains
that companies hold superior information to the government
so as to know the value of their works better than the
government.208 Second, even though inventors or authors
receive similar economic incentives from the IP regime, the
IP regime unequally provides a narrower scope of protection
for copyrights compared to patents. Mark Lemley
distinguishes copyright protection from patent protection209:
as the protection scope of copyrights only applies to the exact
expression of copyright works, rather than ideas or functions
embedded in the works.210 However, with a narrower
protection scope, authors may have a stronger desire other
than economic compensation they receive from copyrights
than inventors of patents.211
C. Non-Economic Incentives for Copyright Owners
Copyright owners have non-economic interests that
drive them to innovate or litigate. Peter Yu contends that
authors value copyrights beyond ordinary properties.212
Steve Calandrillo has thoroughly explained various noneconomic incentives of authors to innovate.213 He has
summarized that authors have natural and moral rights over

208. See Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Optimality of the Patent Renewal System,
30 RAND J. ECON. 181, 181 (1999).
209. Mark A. Lemley, Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1013–14 (1996-1997).
210. See id.
211. See Gilden, supra note 25, at 1055 (arguing that copyrights are
“trademark-like” and copyright infringements may create “market confusion”);
see, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 81 (2d. Cir. 2010).
212. See Peter Yu, The Anatomy of the Human Rights Framework for
Intellectual Property, 69 SMU L. REV. 37, 88 (2016).
213. See Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Property Rights in
Information: Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to
Generate Information, and the Alternative of a Government-Run Reward System,
9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301, 316–23 (1998).
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copyrights.214 These rights, with respect to copyrights, are
categorized as human rights; this is reflected in some
international laws,215 such as Article 27 of the UDHR216 and
Article 15.1 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).217
The legal terms of moral rights or human rights,
however, do not match the non-economic incentives of
authors recognized or supported by the U.S. copyright
regime. First, the U.S. has not joined the ICESCR or signed
the UDHR, which both provide a foundation of human rights
for copyrights. Second, the legal term of moral rights stems
from the French concept, droit moral, covering authors’ noneconomic interests and embraced by French copyright law.218
In French, droit moral translates to “rights of personality or
individual civil rights.”219 Without total transplantation of
this concept from France to the U.S., some scholars conclude
that fairness and morality with respect to moral rights are
better protected in France than the U.S.220 Nevertheless,
Jean-Luc Piotraut argues that fairness and morality are not

214. See id. at 312–15. Even though his arguments are made for both patents
and copyrights, the evidence and the literature used are from the area of
copyrights. See id.
215. See Paul L. C. Torremans, Is Copyright a Human Right?, 2007 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 271, 275–79 (2007).
216. UDHR, supra note 177 (“Everyone has the right to the protection of the
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he is the author.”).
217. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, annex, International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 15 (Dec. 16, 1966)
(“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: . . .
To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”).
218. Piotraut, supra note 179, at 595; see Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American
Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795, 818 (2001) (explaining
that the English term “moral rights” is merely the literal translation of droit
moral from French).
219. Piotraut, supra note 179, at 595.
220. See id. (criticizing that “moral rights” is lacking a clear definition in
English, compared to its clear definition in French).
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boundlessly enforced in the French copyright regime, which
is overall coherent with the U.S.221 Therefore, either a broad
term of non-economic rights or specifically named noneconomic rights are less controversial than moral rights in
the setting of U.S. copyright law.222
It is conventional that the utilitarian U.S. copyright law
prefers economic rights to non-economic rights.223 Some
scholars believe that the U.S. copyright regime is built on
pecuniary or property rights, which do not address many
non-economic concerns.224 Such a narrow understanding of
the utilitarian copyright regime in the U.S. also suggests
why French scholars often criticize the U.S. copyright law.225
Modern scholars, however, agree that non-economic
rights over copyrights (e.g., moral rights) do not necessarily
conflict with managing copyrights as property rights.226
Based on Locke’s labor theory, Orit Afori explains that
property rights recognize the natural right that copyrights
are the fruits of authors’ labor.227 However, based on Hegel’s

221. See id. at 566.
222. See Lloyd Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1149, 1211 (1998) (suggesting that it has become gradually less
controversial that the U.S., at some level, has embraced natural and moral
rights—particularly the specific rights from moral rights—over copyrights).
223. See Piotraut, supra note 179, at 552.
224. See Rudolf Monta, The Concept of “Copyright” Versus the “Droit d’Auteur,”
32 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 177 (1959); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright
and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2
(1985).
225. See Piotraut, supra note 179, at 555.
226. See Lee, supra note 218, at 798 (disagreeing with Kwall’s complaint that
the U.S. copyright regime is based on “pecuniary or property rights” and ignores
moral rights of authors); see also Robert C. Bird & Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting
Moral Rights in the United States and the United Kingdom: Challenges and
Opportunities Under the U.K.’s New Performances Regulations, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J.
213, 267 (2006). Contra Kwall, supra note 224.
227. Orit Fischman Afori, Human Rights and Copyright: The Introduction of
Natural Law Considerations into American Copyright Law, 14 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 497, 504 (2004) (arguing that this also corresponds with
Locke’s labor theory for explaining natural law); see generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO
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personality theory, Piotraut argues that non-economic rights
held by copyright owners are personal rights, which do not
conflict with but rather support their property rights.228 In
legislation, Paul Torremans shows that some European
countries (e.g., Germany) adopt property clauses in their
constitutions to protect copyrights as well as cover property
rights and personal rights as the human rights of copyright
owners.229 In other words, copyrights are a nexus of property
rights and non-economic rights. Therefore, even though
Calandrillo has reminded that the IP Clause does not
directly support non-economic rights over copyrights (i.e.,
natural and moral rights),230 U.S. law is not hostile to noneconomic rights over copyrights.231
In fact, non-economic rights are increasingly realized by
authors and courts in the U.S. Justice Holmes first identified
that personality rights of authors are bound with their
works.232 Then, in the late 19th century, Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis found that privacy rights can be realized
through common-law property rights and U.S. copyright law
doctrines.233 Moreover, in psychological theories, copyright
owners have non-economic interests in their works plus
potential monetary damages caused by copyright
infringement.234 Recently, after Garcia v. Google, Inc.,235
where the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce copyrights for the
plaintiff’s non-economic rights, many scholars expressed
their attitudes on the scope of copyright law addressing non-

TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (George Routledge & Sons, 2nd ed. 1887).
228. See Piotraut, supra note 179, at 565.
229. Torremans, supra note 215, at 288–89.
230. See Calandrillo, supra note 213, at 312–13.
231. See generally Piotraut, supra note 179.
232. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
233. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 198. But see Pierre N. Leval,
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1990).
234. See Wang, supra note 89, at 549 (noting that people have plural utility).
235. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015).
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economic rights (e.g., privacy, public rights, emotional
distress).236 Even though there are scholars, like Jeannie
Fromer,237 Eric Goldman and Jessica Silbey,238 and Alfred
Yen,239 who support the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Garcia
and opposing concerns about non-economic interests in
copyright claims, there are also scholars, like Edward Lee,
who extend opinions that copyright law “legitimately
protects . . . reputation or [in some cases the] privacy
interests” of authors.240
By surveying recent copyright cases in the U.S. and the
motivations of copyright owners who sued in those cases,
Andrew Gilden has demonstrated how the Copyright Act is
an effective legal tool for people to pursue their personal
rights or other non-economic rights in courts.241 In detail, he
categorized four main non-economic interests—“family
privacy, sexual autonomy, reputation, or physical and
psychological well-being”—motivating copyright owners to
sue under the Copyright Act.242 Even though these noneconomic rights could be sought under tort law, contract law,
or criminal law, he has indicated that copyright law covers
these rights better than other laws.243 Gilden shows that
courts are likely to give injunctive relief or monetary
damages for people’s non-economic losses under the

236. See Gilden, supra note 25, at 1027–28.
237. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property
Rights Have Been Asserted?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 549, 587 (2015).
238. See Eric Goldman & Jessica Silbey, Copyright’s Memory Hole, 2019 BYU
L. Rev. 929, 996 (2019).
239. See Alfred Yen, The Challenge of Following Good Advice About Copyright
and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 412 (2016).
240. Edward Lee, Suspect Assertions of Copyright, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL.
PROP. 379, 381–82 (2016).
241. See generally Gilden, supra note 25 (suggesting that courts should brave,
rather than ignore, the demands of non-economic interests of copyright owners
in copyrighted works).
242. Id. at 1021, 1025–58.
243. Id. at 1021, 1072.
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Copyright Act, regardless of whether there is an imminent
economic loss.244 Even though courts nominally reject the
enforcement of non-economic interests under the Copyright
Act, plaintiffs’ losses can be interpreted and labeled as a form
of economic loss.245 The courts’ effective application of the
Copyright Act to repair non-economic interests in the name
of economic loss246 has been recognized by plaintiffs and
motivates them to sue under copyright doctrines.247
Nevertheless, the copyright regime still has the problem that
courts have not directly approved, and even reject, noneconomic interests in litigation regarding copyright
infringement.248
After surveying and interviewing creators, the Copyright
Act raised a First Amendment interest for copyright owners
where state entities use their copyrighted work without
permission.249 Because the original expression in the
copyrighted work suggests free speech, states using the
expression without permission constitutes compelled
government speech, which intrudes on authors or other
copyright owners’ right of free speech.250 However, this could
be a much tougher claim to achieve than a claim of copyright
infringement in practice.251

244. See id. at 1056–58.
245. See, e.g., Smith v. NBC Universal, 524 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
246. See generally Andrew Gilden, Sex, Death, and Intellectual Property, 32
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 67, 73 (2018).
247. E.g., Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Gilden,
supra note 25, at 1027.
248. See, e.g., Garcia, 786 F.3d at 745; Bollea v. Gawker Media, L.L.C., 913 F.
Supp. 2d 1325, 1330 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
249. Copyright Alliance, supra note 168, at 8–9.
250. Id.; see also Abraham Drassinower, Copyright Infringement as Compelled
Speech, in NEW FRONTIERS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 203
(Annabelle Lever ed., 2012).
251. The First Amendment and the Copyright Act function differently in
protecting expression.

2021] MODIFY STATE “PIRACY” AFTER ALLEN

525

D. Liability Rule and Non-Economic Interests of Copyright
Owners
Without concerns over non-economic interests held by
copyright owners, Allen should be an efficient rule to justify
copyright disputes between copyright owners and states.
Allen’s outcome can be viewed as an application of the
liability-rule principle raised by Guido Calabresi and
Douglas Melamed.252 In the copyright scenario, under the
liability rule, courts reject injunctive relief and allow
infringers to use copyrighted works by paying monetary
damages. This liability rule is efficiently applied when
transaction costs are high between copyright licensees and
copyright holders for promoting access to knowledge.
Transaction costs are high in two circumstances: first, a
party needs to negotiate with multiple copyright holders to
be licensed; and second, a copyright holder does not license
the party to use the copyright at a reasonable price and
extorts the party.253 Therefore, beyond being a constitutional
right efficient at the macro level, sovereign immunity, like “a
royalty-free compulsory license,”254 is efficient at the micro
level for public libraries, state universities, and other state
institutes, which intensively use copyrighted work to serve
the public interest. Knowing the strong enforcement of
sovereign immunity, plaintiffs will not sue state offenders or
pursue damages without due process concerns, which
reduces litigation numbers and suggests high efficiency.255
Such an application of the liability rule avoids unjust
enrichment for copyright holders and extortion against
states.256

252. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 36.
253. See James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability
Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 NYU L. Rev. 440, 460 (1995).
254. Copyright Alliance, supra note 168, at 7.
255. See Wang, supra note 36, at 389 (explaining that utilitarian courts can
minimize the cost and number of litigations by setting efficient rules).
256. Krier & Schwab, supra note 253, at 466.
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The adoption of the liability rule for efficiency, however,
is not always reasonable. James Krier and Stewart Schwab
criticized the liability rule for over extorting rights from
copyright holders.257 When a state is the offender in a
copyright infringement claim, compensation given by the
state to the copyright owner under due process may not fully
cover the copyright owner’s economic losses. More
importantly, the copyright owner’s non-economic interests
may be totally disregarded, which may harm his innovation
incentives.
Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s instruction, courts
prefer the liability rule to the property rule in patent- or
copyright-infringement litigations for decreasing the
transaction costs of disseminating knowledge.258 The U.S.
Supreme Court only expressively admitted economic
interests owned by copyright holders,259 even though the
economic interests can be broad enough to include some
privacy concerns of authors, such as the right to first
publication.260 The problem is that, regardless of the noneconomic interests that could be compensated for equitably,
plaintiffs can only sue for economic interests and are more
likely to receive damages than a proper equitable remedy,
such as an injunction, for their non-economic losses.261 Even
though a copyright holder who seeks recovery for noneconomic interests may leave with some nominal monetary
damages approved by courts, when the defendant is a state
entity, the copyright holder may not receive even the

257. See id. at 467.
258. See generally eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)
(reaffirming a high standard for receiving a permanent injunction, which
requires a plaintiff to have suffered an irreparable injury that damages fail to
adequately compensate for).
259. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
260. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554
(1985); see also Gilden, supra note 25, at 1025–26, 1073.
261. See, e.g., Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745–47 (9th Cir. 2015)
(refusing to grant an injunction to recover harmed non-economic interests).
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nominal damages. The state entity undervalues some
copyrights when it provides the copyright owner with
insufficient economic interests and zero non-economic
interests, which impairs his innovation incentives.262
Allen is not a proper example to clearly demonstrate this
problem because Mr. Allen’s purpose was to pursue higher
rewards for his copyrights through litigation.263 However,
the problem remains after Allen: when the U.S. Supreme
Court decided the case, it did not recognize non-economic
rights owned by copyright holders implicitly when the
copyright infringer is a state, who usually does not pay
appropriate licensing fees to copyright owners because of
their overwhelming bargaining power.264
III. PROPOSING APOLOGY TO CURE AND PREVENT
STATE “PIRACY”
Several concerns of copyright owners remained during
and after Allen.265 Can the copyright regime maintain its
litigation efficiency and not impair innovation incentives for
authors or their spirit of creativity? When states are immune
from copyright infringement litigation, can the copyright

262. Psychologists suggest that people are discouraged from some behaviors by
punishment and encouraged to conduct particular behaviors by being rewarded.
See SUSAN CLAYTON & GENE MYERS, CONSERVATION PSYCHOLOGY:
UNDERSTANDING AND PROMOTING HUMAN CARE FOR NATURE 148 (2009).
263. See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 999 (2020). North Carolina expressed
an intent to settle for $15,000 and attribution of respective rights to the parties,
which was refused by Allen.
264. The Supreme Court does not distinguish copyrights from patents when
interpreting the Eleventh Amendment and adjudicating upon the validity of the
CRCA. In Florida Prepaid, the Supreme Court held that patents are a form of
property. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642–43 (1999). This rationale was reconfirmed in
Allen; however, non-economic interests are more frequently a concern of
copyright owners than patent owners. Allen, 140 S. Ct., at 1004. Therefore, there
are scholars, like Gilden, who explore copyright cases and the non-economic
concerns behind copyright infringement cases. Gilden, supra note 25.
265. See generally Allen, 140 S. Ct. 994.
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regime avoid abuse of the immunity?266 Because copyright
owners may only receive limited compensation from a state,
is it possible for the state to address their non-economic
injuries in an approach other than overpaying them
monetary damages?
Some scholars have introduced apology as a new form of
civil remedy in the U.S. for people who have experienced
“emotional or symbolic injuries.”267 Liesbeth Hulst and Arno
Akkermans argue that money cannot substitute proper
compensation for non-economic losses, even though they
agree that money has symbolic value providing recognition
and satisfaction.268 Robyn Carroll suggests apology should
complement monetary damages in compensating for mental
distress.269 Brent White indicates that compelled apologies
have been broadly used in criminal law to deter crime, heal
psychological injuries, and reinforce social norms.270 There is
also a demonstrated demand for apologies by plaintiffs in
certain civil disputes (e.g., medical malpractice271). White
also highlights the particular value of apology when
expressed by the government: people seek apology from the
government as a means to acquire respect and value

266. See Brief of Oracle America, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, supra note 94, at 10.
267. See Brent T. White, Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil
Rights Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 1265 (2006).
268. Liesbeth Hulst & Arno J. Akkermans, Can Money Symbolize
Acknowledgment? How Victims’ Relatives Perceive Monetary Awards for Their
Emotional Harm, 4 PSYCHOL. INJ. & L. 245, 256–57 (2011).
269. See Robyn Carroll, Beyond Compensation: Apology as a Private Law
Remedy, in THE LAW OF REMEDIES: NEW DIRECTION IN THE COMMON LAW, 323,
324–26 (Jeff Berryman & Rick Bigwood eds., 2010).
270. White, supra note 267, at 1270.
271. Id. at 1269, 1271; see also Amy B. Witman et al., How Do Patients Want
Physicians to Handle Mistakes? A Survey of Internal Medicine Patients in an
Academic Setting, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2565 (1996); Thomas H.
Gallagher et al., Patients’ and Physicians’ Attitudes Regarding the Disclosure of
Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001 (2003).
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recognized by the government.272
Consistent with the above literature, this Article
suggests the copyright regime adopts state apologies for
alleviating the non-economic harms to copyright owners.
State infringers should be compelled to or voluntarily
apologize to compensate copyright holders. One approach is
that legislation, especially congressional legislation, should
evolve to include compelled state apologies for copyright
infringements. Therefore, courts can order a compelled
apology for copyright owners if an infringer is a state.
Alternatively, states should consider voluntarily comforting
emotional or mental distress of copyright owners by
identifying the sources of copyrighted works and offering
commendation for copyright owners. This Part first explains
why state apologies are needed for copyright infringement by
states and defines state apologies under the proposal. Then,
it explains why and how it can be justified in the U.S.
copyright regime with evidence showing how apologies are
reasonably adopted in other jurisdictions.
A. Need for State Apology
A state apology in a copyright context is not necessarily
an “I am sorry.” An apology can be expressed in various
forms, “including expressions of regret, admission of
responsibility or fault or damage, request for forgiveness, a
promise of forbearance or some offer of reparation,
restitution or compensation, and/or a promise that the
offense will not be repeated.”273 Not all of these forms of

272. See White, supra note 267, at 1281.
273. Sophie M. Beesley, Effect of Apology Focus on Perceptions of Sincerity,
Apology Acceptance and Forgiveness, 7 (2010) (B.A. thesis, Edith Cowan
University) (on file with Edith Cowan University); see also Bruce W. Darby &
Barry R. Schlenker, Children’s Reactions to Apologies, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 742, 744 (1982); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology as Aggression Control:
Its Role in Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 219 (1989); Manfred Schmitt et al., Effects of Objective and
Subjective Account Components on Forgiving, 144 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 465 (2004).
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apologies are proper or effective for alleviating concerns
about copyright infringement by states or contributing to
innovation incentives. A state can provide particular forms
of apologies to copyright owners depending on various
purposes. Meanwhile, a state apology in this proposal can be
defined by states with explanations about their policy goals
and the economic and psychological rationale.
The ultimate purpose for a state to provide compelled or
voluntary apologies to a harmed author is to reconstruct the
relationship between an alleged state infringer and the
author for encouraging his continuous innovation.274 This
goal motivates legislators to add compelled apologies as
remedies in copyright statutes, plaintiffs to claim for
apologies, courts to apply such statutes, and states to offer
apologies to authors voluntarily. It is also the foundation for
achieving the policy goals of strengthening copyright
protection, promoting litigation efficiency, and encouraging
innovation.
First, the use of apology should be able to promote
settlement, which is a commonly agreed upon notion.275 How
effective apologies are to moderate aggression depends on
facts and specific apologies.276 In the copyright infringement
context, an ideal apology from a state offender establishes
dialogues with a copyright owner and offers nominal
economic compensation. In the dialogues, the copyright
owner has a chance to express his non-economic concerns,
including his emotional distress. The alleged state infringer
can explain its negligence and the public interest underlying

274. See Beesley, supra note 273, at 7; see also E. Goffman, On Face-Work: An
Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interaction, 18 PSYCHIATRY: J. STUD.
INTERPERSONAL PROCESSES 213 (1955) (suggesting the importance of reputation
to apology recipients in any further cooperation); White, supra note 267, at 1267.
275. See generally Max Bolstad, Learning from Japan: The Case for Increased
Use of Apology in Mediation, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 545 (2000) (suggesting the use
of apology in mediation).
276. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement, 45 CT. REV. 90, 91
(2008).
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the use of the copyrighted work to the author. Such dialogues
can reduce aggression and heal the author’s emotional
distress. Moreover, the state can comfort him with
acknowledgment,
recognition,
and
some
economic
277
compensation to reduce aggression further.
The whole
process makes the copyright owner perceive that the state’s
payment compromises public interests and the copyright
owner’s interests.278 Even though an author insists on strong
economic interests, empirical evidence implies that he may
be more likely to reduce his expectations of monetary
compensation and improve expectations of the relationship
with the state infringer after receiving an apology from the
state.279 Although an apology is still insufficient for some
copyright owners, they are prevented from suing for more
economic damages after the apology. The process of
delivering that apology can satisfy the due process
requirement so as to avoid unconstitutional copyright
infringement.280
Second, apologies should be able to rebuild the
reputation of harmed copyright owners, which is critical to
their innovation incentives, regardless of economic or non-

277. See Prue E. Vines, Apologies and Civil Liability in England, Wales and
Scotland: The View from Elsewhere, 12 EDINBURGH L. REV. 200, 206 (2008).
278. See Robbennolt, supra note 276, at 93 (suggesting that a victim is more
likely to accept an apology if he feels that the solution is a reciprocal concession).
279. See generally Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and
Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 349 (2008).
280. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1985) (“[T]he Due Process
Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing
unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.”). In civil proceedings, an
evaluation test is applied for balancing a copyright owner’s interest and the
public interest represented by the government. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1975) (“First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”).
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economic interests sought.281 If a copyright owner seeks
compensation for economic interests, regardless of the
economic compensation amount, a state offender can offer
apologies to assist in building the reputation or goodwill of
the copyright owner, which will help to generate economic
interests from the market in the long term. For example, a
state can award a prize to copyright owners for their
contributions to the public interest, for which individual
owners can apply. Here, the prize functions as an apology.
Alternatively, a state can seek authorization from the
copyright owner to advertise its use of the copyrighted work,
suggesting a beneficial social influence of the work. States
should publicly acknowledge the contributors of copyrighted
works, avoiding follow-on infringement.
If a copyright owner seeks non-economic interests, state
entities or courts should identify which interests or private
rights constitute the main concern or discouragement of
innovation. Apologies can heal emotional distress of authors
or other authorship rights to preserve their innovation
incentives and enthusiasm. Here, apologies can be a public
acknowledgment of the authorship of copyright owners,282
repairing their personal reputation or healing their
emotional distress. Alternatively, apologies can be dialogues,
providing authors a factual explanation of negligent
behaviors without admission of the offense,283 a policy
explanation with respect to public interests, or an
opportunity to express their emotional distress to the state
offender. Other incentives promoted by non-economic theory
scholars, such as whether to repair “family privacy [and]
281. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 19, at 42-48 (explaining the intrinsic
interests incentivizing innovation, including reputation).
282. See Brent T. White, Saving Face: The Benefits of Not Saying I’m Sorry, 72
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 261, 264 (2009) (criticizing the effectiveness of apology and
forgiveness but upholding acknowledgement and cooperation).
283. See, e.g., Vines, supra note 277, at 7; see also Kathryn Anderson et al., A
30-Month Study of Patient Complaints at a Major Australian Hospital, 21 J.
QUALITY CLINICAL PRAC. 109, 111 (2001) (showing that most victims of healthcare
disputes are effectively comforted by an explanation).
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sexual autonomy”284 by apologies, are a separate issue,
inapplicable in a utilitarian copyright regime.
B. Compelled State Apologies
In future federal and state copyright law reforms,
copyright statutes should list apologies as a form of equitable
relief supplementing injunctive relief against state copyright
infringers in cases where states waive their sovereign
immunity or cannot claim sovereign immunity because of
unconstitutional actions (i.e., copyright infringement
without due process). It is not necessary to define the
apology’s specific form—private or public, formal or
informal—or expression in the copyright compensation
legislation, but can be ordered based on the claims raised by
plaintiffs and the discretion of judges or state offenders.285
People can seek public apology as a legal remedy in many
jurisdictions outside of the U.S. (e.g., many Asian countries,
a few European countries, Canada, and Australia).286
284. Gilden, supra note 25, at 1021.
285. White suggests that judges should have discretion when ordering
apologies because they are fact-related. White, supra note 267, 1308–09. The
form of apologies is complex, so the legislative language in most jurisdictions
adopting an apology as a remedy does not define it. For example, in China, the
China’s Civil Code only lists apologies as a form of apology without any details.
[Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 28, 2020, effective Jan. 1, 2021), art. 179.11. In
Queensland Australia, the Anti-Discrimination Act lists a private apology and a
public apology as a legislative remedy. Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 209
(Austl.) (“[A]n order requiring the respondent to make a private apology or
retraction; . . . an order requiring the respondent to make a public apology or
retraction by publishing the apology or retraction in the way, and in the form,
stated in the order.”).
286. These countries include but are not limited to Japan, China, Indonesia,
South Korea, Vietnam, England and Wales, Canada, Ukraine, Slovakia, Russia,
Turkey, and Poland. See Andrea Zwart-Hink et al., Compelled Apologies as a
Legal Remedy: Some Thoughts from a Civil Law Jurisdiction, 38 U. W. AUSTL. L.
REV. 100, 100 n.3 (2014); Nicola Brutti, Legal Narratives and Compensation
Trends in Tort Law: The Case of Public Apology, 24 EUR. BUS. L. REV., 127, 131–
33 (2013); White, supra note 267, at 1262 n.2; Robyn Carroll et al., Apology
Legislation and Its Implications for International Dispute Resolution, 9 DISP.
RESOL. INT’L, no. 2, Oct. 2015, at 115, 116–17.
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Apologies, especially public apologies, are broadly applied as
remedies in civil disputes in Japan and China. In Japan,
apologies are effective compensation, as crucial as monetary
damages, for individuals and entities.287 In China, courtordered apologies are provided for in China’s Civil Code,288
parallel to other legislative remedies, and lavishly granted
by courts in IP disputes to fix the losses beyond what can be
quantitively estimated, such as a company’s goodwill.289 In
Australia, public or private apologies are applied to repair
injuries on civil rights, such as discrimination,290 and have
been effectively applied broadly in both civil and criminal
disputes.291 In the Netherlands, the Dutch Civil Code allows
apologies as remedies for defamation,292 and there are
scholars who believe that Dutch law can embrace public
apologies more broadly as in Australia.293
The U.S. movement towards apology is partially
motivated Australia, Canada, and the U.K.294 These
jurisdictions adopt apologies as a form of civil remedies in
legislation.295 Even though the U.S. has not adopted apology
as a form of civil remedies by statute, White argues that the
seed has been planted.296 He believes that equitable relief
allowed by the Civil Right Act of 1871 should include
apology.297 There is a possibility this seed develops in the
287. Bolstad, supra note 275, at 558.
288. Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China, art. 179.11.
289. See Wang, supra note 36, at 353 (showing that Chinese courts are
commonly guided to order public apologies for healing victims in trademark
infringement cases and unfair competition cases).
290. See Robyn Carroll, Apologies as a Legal Remedy, 35 SYDNEY L. REV. 317,
328 (2013).
291. Id. at 321.
292. See Zwart-Hink et al., supra note 286, at 101.
293. See, e.g., id.
294. See Vines, supra note 277, at 11.
295. See, e.g., British Columbia Apology Act, S.B.C. 2006, c. 19 (Can.).
296. See White, supra note 267, at 1303.
297. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But see, e.g., Minneapolis v. Richardson, 239 N.W.2d
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new CRCA and state copyright laws to clearly indicate
apology as a type of equitable remedy for copyright owners
against states.
C. Voluntary State Apologies
Addressing the policy goal of promoting settlement and
innovation, a state entity may consider voluntarily offering
apologies to copyright owners. In this circumstance,
psychological literature suggests the timing of apologies
matters to their effectiveness.298 Several scholars propose
that injured parties care about the timing of apologies299 and
psychological data suggest that early apologies are effective
in comforting injured parties.300 However, delayed apologies
may also be effective if injured parties perceive the apologies
as sincere.301 The timing of apologies may depend on the
economic or emotional status of injured parties, as that
status relates to whether they are ready to accept apologies
as sincere. Accordingly, state apologies can be given in stages
depending on the needs of copyright owners.
It likely does not harm the beneficial effect of apology if
a state entity provides an early apology. An early apology is
to publicly acknowledge the source and the contributors of
197, 205–06 (Minn. 1976) (refusing to admit compelled apologies as proper
injunctive relief).
298. See Robyn Carroll et al., Apologies, Mediation and the Law: Resolution of
Civil Disputes, 7 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 569, 577 (2017) (reviewing the
psychological literature about the timing of apologies).
299. See, e.g., Sim B. Sitkin & Robert J. Bies, Social Accounts in Conflict
Situations: Using Explanations to Manage Conflict, 46 HUM. RELS. 349 (1993);
Alfred Allan et al., Parties’ Perceptions of Apologies in Resolving Equal
Opportunity Complaints, 17 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCH. & L. 538, 544 (2010).
300. See John F. Kremer & Laura Stephens, Attributions and Arousal as
Mediators of Mitigation’s Effect on Retaliation, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.,
335, 335 (1983); Dolf Zillman & Joanne Cantor, The Timing of Information About
Mitigating Circumstances on Emotional Responses to Provocation and
Retaliatory Behaviour, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 38, 38 (1967).
301. See Cynthia M. Frantz & Courtney Bennigson, Better Late Than Early:
The Influence of Timing on Apology Effectiveness, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCH. 201, 201 (2005).
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copyrighted works that a state uses publicly and remind the
public of the respective rights embedded in the works. This
form of apology attempts to prevent recurrent copyright
infringement by parties other than the state entity.
However, obviously, such an early apology did not effectively
comfort Mr. Allen, who insisted on great monetary
damages.302 By itself, the early apology does not satisfy due
process or suggest how states respect copyrights or property
rights. Therefore, state entities should also be ready to
actively respond to the continuing concerns of copyright
owners.
An active response to copyright owners is the next stage
of an apology. Dialogues between a state offender and a
copyright owner facilitate an understanding of each other’s
needs and promote settlement. Building in dialogues as part
of a normal process may avoid social condemnation of a state
as a result of perceptions that it does not respect copyrights
or property rights and function as due process. States may
offer authors agreeable remedies during the dialogues in the
communication process itself or some limited licensing fees.
In order to sustain and even promote innovation incentives,
states may use this opportunity to propose a “prize-formed
apology” to restore or even improve the reputation of the
injured copyright owners, even though they may lack the
legal basis to pursue litigation, because of the fair-use
doctrine or state sovereignty immunity. A “prize-formed
apology” can be as minimal as a nominal award, such as
officially introducing the photographers whose photographs
won the highest click-through rate in a year. Offering a
“prize-formed apology” can be the last stage of a state’s
voluntary apology.
D. A Protection Foundation for Adopting State Apologies
Apology protection should be in place before adopting
apologies as a legislative remedy for copyright infringement.
302. See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 999 (2020).
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Under apology protection, apologies to copyright owners per
se do not suggest evidence of intentional or negligent
copyright infringement or any liability. Therefore, apology
protection allows the advantages of apologies to victims and
society303 but precludes those who expresses apology from
liability raised by the apologies.304
Carroll lists thirty-six states introducing apology
protection in their civil-action legislation.305 Regardless of
whether apology is introduced in relation to copyrights or
not, the purposes of those statutes or codes are to protect
apologetic discourse or behaviors in civil actions and exclude
admission of apologies as evidence for showing liability. For
example, in Massachusetts, the first state in the U.S. to
introduce apology in state legislation,
[s]tatements, writings or benevolent gestures expressing
sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to the pain,
suffering or death of a person involved in an accident and made to
such person or to the family of such person shall be inadmissible as

303. See supra Part II.
304. See Vines, supra note 277, at 224–30 tbls. 1–2 (showing the types of
liabilities excluded by apology protection statutes in some jurisdictions).
305. Carroll et al., supra note 286, at 116 n.3; see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12-2605 (2005); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160 (West 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25135 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-184d (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4318
(2006); D.C. CODE § 16-2841 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 90.4026 (2001); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 24-4-416 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rule 409.5 (2007); IDAHO CODE § 9207 (2006); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 8-1901 (2013); IND. CODE § 34-43.5-1-3 (2006);
IOWA CODE § 622.31 (2007); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.5 (2005); ME. STAT. tit. 24,
§ 2907 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-920 (West 2004); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (1986); MO. REV. STAT. § 538.229 (2005); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 26-1-814 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-1201 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 507-E:4 (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 413 (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 3104-12 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43 (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63,
§ 1-1708.1H (2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.082 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-190
(2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-411.1 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 409.1 (2003);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (1999); UTAH R. EVID. 409 (2010); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1912 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20:1 (2005); WASH.
REV. CODE § 5.64.010 (2006); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-11a (2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 11-130 (2004).
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evidence of an admission of liability in a civil action.”306

After Massachusetts, other states adopted provisions to
protect apologies from creating liability during the 1990s and
early 2000s,307 responding to the “tort crisis” beginning in the
1960s.308 The scope of the protection varies among states.
Some states only protect apologies given by healthcare
providers: Arizona,309 Colorado,310 and the District of
Columbia.311 Some states protect apologies for negligence
actions or accidents: Florida,312 Tennessee,313 and Texas.314
Some states broadly protect apologies for any civil actions:
Hawaii,315 Missouri,316 and South Carolina.317 Therefore, one
step before the copyright regime adopts compelled or
voluntary state apologies, congressional- and state-level
legislators should approve the protection of “partial”
apologies in copyright infringement cases.318

306. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (1986) (“‘Accident’, an occurrence
resulting in injury or death to one or more persons which is not the result of
willful action by a party.”).
307. Vines, supra note 277, at 2.
308. See id.; see also Stephen D Sugarman, United States Tort Reform Wars,
2 (Aug. 2002)(unpublished manuscript) (on file with University of California,
Berkeley), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/United_States_Tort_Reform_Wars
_A.TORTS.pdf (“Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s tort law became
increasingly pro-victim.”).
309. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2605 (2005).
310. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 (2003).
311. D.C. CODE § 16-2841 (2007).
312. FLA. STAT. § 90.4026 (2001).
313. TENN. CODE ANN. § 409.1 (2003).
314. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (1999).
315. HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rule 409.5 (2007).
316. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.229 (2005).
317. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-190 (2006).
318. Carroll et al. define a “partial” apology as “an apology that offers an
expression of regret or sympathy but that does not incorporate an admission of
fault or wrongdoing . . . a ‘full’ apology [incorporates] both.” Carroll et al., supra
note 286, at 126 (“In the US, more states have favoured the protection of a partial
apology, as opposed to a full apology.”). Jonathan Cohen calls “partial” apologies
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF STATE APOLOGIES IN
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENTS
The biggest concern in introducing apologies as
compensation for copyright owners when copyright
infringement is committed by a state entity is the effect of
apologies on copyright owners, the government, and the
society. While Part II discusses why apologies should be
offered voluntarily by state offenders or ordered by courts
against state infringers, are compelled or voluntary
apologies actually effective manners to compensate copyright
owners? How effective are apologies offered by a state
offender in sustaining the injured author’s innovation
incentives and passions for creativity? What are the effects
of the apologies on other authors and state entities? Based
on these concerns, this Part discusses the justification of
state apologies for using copyrighted works.
A. No Extra Litigation for Compelled Apologies
If compelled apologies become a legal remedy, there are
three circumstances where a copyright owner will sue for a
compelled apology against a state offender. First, his or her
offended non-economic interests, such as emotional distress,
can only be repaired by public apologies. Second, an apology
request to a state suggests a powerless copyright owner’s
strong desire for copyright protection against the state
offender.319 Third, a copyright owner sues to protect other
authors’ interests and avoid similar harms happening to
other authors.320 These three motives may collaboratively
“safe apologies.” See Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1009, 1067 (1999). Canadian legislation protects a full apology, defining
apology as “an expression of sympathy or regret, a statement that one is sorry or
any other words or actions indicating contrition or commiseration, whether or not
the words or actions admit or imply an admission of fault in connection with the
matter to which the words or actions relate.” British Columbia Apology Act,
S.B.C. 2006, c. 19 (Can.).
319. See White, supra note 267, at 1298.
320. See generally HAZEL GENN & ALAN PATERSON, PATHS TO JUSTICE SCOTLAND:
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induce a copyright owner to sue for an apology.321 Compared
to these three motives, the attribution of fault, which
primarily motivates people to sue for apologies,322 has not
been suggested by the theory or practice of copyright
infringement as a litigation incentive.323
It may be unlikely that copyright owners sue a state
offender only for an apology. This is not a rational reason for
filing a lawsuit because litigation is expensive and timeconsuming. In such litigations, the economic interests for
copyright owners cannot be recovered. The copyright owner
also pays extra high litigation fees for non-economic interests
or indirect economic interests, such as goodwill. Therefore,
in most circumstances, a claim for a compelled apology will
supplement, rather than substitute, other traditional
remedies (e.g., injunctive relief or monetary damages) sought
by copyright owners.324 It does not mean that there are no
copyright owners who will only sue for an apology.325 If their
economic or non-economic damages, which a state apology
can repair, are higher than the marginal litigation costs, they
will sue only for an apology.
B. Effective Compelled Apologies
Whether compelled apologies are effective remedies for
an injured party is controversial due to the unknown
sincerity of compelled apologies. Some Australian courts
WHAT PEOPLE IN SCOTLAND DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW 183 (2001).
321. See Vines, supra note 277, at 14.
322. See id. (citing D. HARRIS ET AL., COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS
151 (1985)).

AND INJURY

323. See, e.g., Gilden, supra note 25, at 1021.
324. See Michael Landau, State Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property
Revisited, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 514, 543 (2012) (claiming
an injunction should not be a reasonable substitute for damages when the
infringer is a state).
325. See Copyright Alliance, supra note 27, at 13 (stating 50% of the surveyed
copyright owners expressed an intent to only sue for an injunction in the
Copyright Alliance’s 2020 survey while only 9% of the surveyed copyright owners
plan not to file a lawsuit only for an injunction).
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criticize that compelled apologies are “insincere,
meaningless and therefore futile.”326 So do Dutch courts,
most of which believe that compelled apologies do not add
value to victims and are not enforceable.327 The conventional
literature supports the argument that insincere apologies
are ineffective.328 For example, Cohen criticized compelled
apologies as insincere and carrying little meaning, and
suggested that a voluntary apology is most effective.329
Similarly, the effectiveness of voluntary, but strategic,
apologies made in hopes of inducing a settlement is also
doubted for lack of sincerity.330
Recent psychological literature, however, disputes the
above criticisms and suggests that compelled apologies are
effective and valuable to whoever seeks them.331 The
rationale is that an apology’s sincerity does not make much
difference in the purposes of delivering an apology.332
Moreover, when a state is the offender and delivers an
apology for its ultimate utilitarian purpose of promoting
creative expressions and innovation, apology recipients

326. Robyn Carroll & Normann Witzleb, “It’s Not Just About the Money”—
Enhancing the Vindicatory Effect of Private Law Remedies, 37 Monash U. L. Rev.
216, 232 (2011).
327. Zwart-Hink et al., supra note 286, at 117.
328. See Cohen, supra note 318, at 1017 (“For an apology to comfort the injured
party, it must be sincere, or at least perceived to be sincere.”); see also Sim B.
Sitkin & Robert J. Bies, Social Accounts in Conflict Situations: Using
Explanation to Manage Conflict, 46 HUM. REL. 349, 359 (1993).
329. Cohen, supra note 318, at 1018.
330. See Nick Smith, The Categorical Apology, 36 J. SOC. PHIL. 473, 491–92
(2005).
331. See Zwart-Hink et al., supra note 286, at 120; see also AARON LAZARE, ON
APOLOGY 117 (2004).
332. See Zwart-Hink et al., supra note 286, at 120; see also Jane L. Risen &
Thomas Gilovich, Target and Observer Differences in the Acceptance of
Questionable Apologies, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., 418, 418 (2007).
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cannot tell333 or may not care334 about the apology’s sincerity.
Especially when a court does not order extra damages to be
paid by a state in addition to a compelled apology, the
apology’s sincerity does not matter.335
C. Rebuilding Legal and Social Standing of Copyright
Owners
Regardless of an apology’s sincerity, the psychological
literature suggests that an apology can serve two primary
process purposes, which can be applied when a state
infringes copyrights.336 First, an apology suggests
acknowledgment of violation of social or moral contracts or
rules, and functions as a reaffirmation of the legitimacy of
those contracts or rules.337 In the copyright scenario, the key
to an apology is not to acknowledge any faults of a state
entity for its use of a copyrighted work.338 Instead, it is to
acknowledge the value of the work and the robustness of
copyright protection.339 Therefore, even though there are
scholars like Brent White who implied that compelled
apologies might humiliate state officials who deliver the

333. See Cohen, supra note 318, at 1050 (“Apologies are likely to be more
powerful when they come from the client rather than the lawyer.”). The state
government offender always needs an agent, who may be a government official
or a state’s attorney who represents the state government, to deliver the apology.
Therefore, whether the client or the lawyer makes an apology does not make a
difference when the client is a state government.
334. See White, supra note 267, at 1279 (stating both “voluntary and forced
apologies” offer “high expressive utility”).
335. See Robbennolt, supra note 276, at 93.
336. See Risen & Gilovich, supra note 332, at 418 (summarizing several
purposes of apologies in the literature, which can be distinguished between
sincere and insincere apologies).
337. See Zwart-Hink et al., supra note 286, at 120; see also B. W. Darby & B.
R. Schlenker, Children’s Reactions to Apologies, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 742, 742 (1982).
338. But see Vines, supra note 277, at 9 (emphasizing the importance of
acknowledging fault in an effective apology).
339. See White, supra note 267, at 1295.
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apologies,340 this should not be a concern in a copyright
infringement context. Allen reconfirms state sovereign
immunity in copyright issues, authoritatively preventing
most copyright infringement litigations against a state.341
The U.S. Supreme Court explained that Article I, Section 8
of the U.S. Constitution does not preempt the immunity.342
However, when a state uses a copyrighted work without
authorization from the author, either a compelled apology or
a voluntary apology from this state offender acknowledges
the principles in Article I, Section 8 that the society should
protect copyrights and encourage innovation.
Second, an apology can restore the injured party’s social
standing.343 When a state entity publicly acknowledges the
author’s copyrighted work, the work’s value and the author’s
contribution to the public are acknowledged.344 The
acknowledgment
also
prevents
further
copyright
infringements by the public or any follow-on infringers. The
key to effective apologies is recognizing the needs and
feelings of the injured party.345 Here, the author’s concern
that relates to his or her innovation incentives is about
effective copyright protection and his or her authorshiprelated rights. Moreover, when a state entity explains its use
of the work without any payments, or only with limited
payments, and highlights its concerns about the public
interest, the author is more likely to understand the message
that his or her self-sacrifice for the common good is necessary
and is more likely to allow the use. By contrast, if the state
entity is silent about the concerns regarding its use of the
340. See id. at 1297.
341. See generally Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1001 (2020).
342. See Calandrillo, supra note 213, at 312–13.
343. See Ken-Ichi Ohbuchi & Kobun Sato, Children’s Reactions to Mitigating
Accounts: Apologies, Excuses, and Intentionality of Harm, 134 J. SOC. PSYCHOL.
5, 5 (1994); see also Goffman, supra note 274, at 213.
344. See White, supra note 267, at 1267 (suggesting that public apologies can
convey important social messages).
345. See id. at 1292–93.
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copyrighted work based on constitutional immunity, it is not
only unpleasant to the author, but the state entity may also
lack due process to claim sovereign immunity and avoid
potential litigation.
D. Repairing Rewards for Copyright Owners
The monopoly power of copyrights is not secure because
of sovereign immunity.346 States may not be incentivized to
intentionally infringe copyrights after the U.S. Supreme
Court clarified the application of sovereign immunity in
Allen.347 Moreover, some particular state entities put efforts
in training about copyright protection and avoiding copyright
infringement.348 However, the monopoly power is still
deprived when copyright owners are prevented from
receiving expected rewards for a state’s impermissible use of
copyrighted works because of the immunity.349
The monopoly deprivation by a state offender can be
compensated by social rewards in the state’s apologies so as
to maintain the innovation incentives of authors.350 A state
apology, either compelled or voluntary, constitutes rewards
for copyright owners, compensating their economic or noneconomic interests. Even though the apology is different from
monetary damages, it suggests a monetizable benefit,351 such
346. See Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property versus Prizes: Reframing the
Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1014 (2014).
347. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
about
Copyright,
UCLA
LIBRARY,
348. See,
e.g.,
Learn
https://www.library.ucla.edu/support/publishing-data-management/scholarlycommunication-resources-education/learn-about-copyright (last visited July 18,
2020); Copyright Services, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES,
https://library.osu.edu/copyright (last visited July 18, 2020).
349. See, e.g., Copyright Alliance, supra note 27, at 19 (“[Dr. Keith Bell]
estimates that all told, the misappropriation of his works [by states] has deprived
him of approximately $100 million in sales or licensing opportunities.”).
350. See Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging
Innovation, 113 Q. J. ECON. 1137, 1139 (1998) (suggesting that proper patent
buyouts or expropriation of patents results in positive innovation outcomes).
351. Cf. Lindsay Church, Government Subsidies and Intellectual Property
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as positive goodwill or remarkable achievements valuable to
the public. By delivering apologies, state entities have the
discretion to subsidize or reward authors for their
copyrighted works.352
There is vast literature comparing a prize mechanism
(providing government rewards or subsidies) and an IP
regime (providing monopoly rights) in exploring an optimal
policy for promoting creative expressions and innovation. In
theory, there are no differences between direct rewards given
by the government and indirect rewards given by the IP
regime and acquired from the market.353 Direct government
funding or subsidies for innovation could be more effective in
spurring innovation than the IP regime.354 However, the
government needs to understand the innovation’s (social)
value in order to provide effective rewards, which results in
high administrative costs and inefficiency.355 The high
administrative and time costs are the primary drawbacks of
using direct rewards, making the IP regime superior to
government funding or subsidies for innovation and creative
expressions.356
While apologies as government rewards do not eliminate
the high administrative and time costs in a prize mechanism,
apologies are superior to monetary rewards or subsidies in
Rights: Confining the Applicability of the Subsidies Doctrine to Cash Benefits, 30
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 263, 278 (2016) (analyzing alternative benefits for IP rights
owners in addition to cash).
352. See id. at 274 (indicating that the government has a direction to fund or
subsidize inventors, which functions as substitutes of IP protection).
353. See Michael B. Abramowicz, Prize and Reward Alternatives to Intellectual
Property, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW 350, 350-51 (2019); Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 197, at 532–33.
354. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 137–66
(2004) (expressing concerns about unavoidable deadweight loss in an IP regime
in promoting innovation).
355. See Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 197, 543–47; Abramowicz, supra note
353, at 352.
356. Ana Ramalho, Intellectual Property and Social
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2033102 (last visited July 12, 2020).

Justice,

SSRN,
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terms of efficiency and superior to a pure copyright regime in
promoting innovation and creative expressions. One reason
for this is that apologies, as rewards or subsidies, do not
replace monopoly profits of copyrights but merely
supplement the monopoly profits supported by copyrights.357
The rewards, in the form of a state apology, are also ex-post
as copyright rights. Copyright owners can only seek rewards
after the value of the copyrighted work has been recognized
by a state user. The difficulty in setting proper rewards or
subsidies due to lack of information will be overcome by the
government in delivering or trying to deliver an apology to a
copyright owner.358 Therefore, by rewarding through
apologies, there is no efficiency concern in excessive
rewards.359
E. Social Influence on Promoting Innovation
According to the psychological literature, compelled or
voluntary state apologies do not only comfort copyright
owners but also have social influences.360 Recall the
utilitarian goal of states in offering voluntary apologies in
copyright cases, which is to repair and rebuild the
relationship between a state offender and a harmed
author.361 Offering or delivering apologies is a process
through which a state entity shows its efforts to avoid
copyright infringement and not intentionally infringe

357. But see SHAVELL, supra note 354, at 161 (suggesting that prizes are “a
fundamental alternative” to the property rights in copyrights).
358. See Roin, supra note 346, at 1008.
359. Cf. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 623 (1962) (expressing doubts as to the accurate calculation
of ex-post returns).
360. See Mark Bennett & Christopher Dewberry, “I’ve Said I’m Sorry, Haven’t
I?” A Study of the Identity Implications and Constraints that Apologies Create for
Their Recipients, 13 CURRENT PSYCH. 10, 19–20 (1994) (arguing that apologies
have individualistic meanings and social meanings).
361. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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copyrights.362 In psychology, that process helps to rebuild the
trust of a harmed author and any authors in authority (e.g.,
the government and the copyright regime).363 Therefore,
people can rely on the copyright regime and maintain their
innovation incentives.
A probable disagreement is that apologies, especially
court-ordered apologies, are not effective. Then, how could
ineffective apologies affect a group of people or firms beyond
direct victims? The literature suggests that an apology’s
sincerity does not matter to a victim but only matters to
observers, who may complain that the apology is flattery.364
However, state apologies serve a real purpose, are not
flattery, and authors are not merely observers but also
participants in this circumstance of copyright infringement.
On the one hand, after understanding how state
apologies secure the innovation incentives of authors
received from the copyright regime, states have incentives to
apologize for their impermissible use of copyrighted works.365
An apology is given under its discretion. Moreover, even
though a state entity is compelled to apologize to a copyright
owner, a compelled apology can heighten its awareness of
copyright protection overall.366 Psychological theories

362. See Bennett & Dewberry, supra note 360, at 11 (explaining that in an
apology “efforts are made to persuade the audience that the offending behavior
is not a valid representation of the actor’s character”).
363. See Cohen, supra note 318, at 1021 (suggesting that an apology secures or
even improves the offender’s reputation).
364. See Risen & Gilovich, supra note 332, at 418.
365. See generally Frank J. Chaloupka, Mechanisms of Legal Effect:
Perspectives
from
Economics
(Mar.
15,
2012),
http://publichealthlawresearch.org/sites/default/files/downloads/resource/Chalou
pka-EconomicPerspectives-15March2012.pdf (explaining how the law affects
behaviors from an economic perspective of the balance between economic
demands and supplies).
366. See White, supra note 267, at 1285 (suggesting that government apologies
can justify the government’s attitudes towards and recognition of particular
things).
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suggest such an intrinsic change.367 It can also undoubtedly
prevent an opposite intrinsic change that creators worry
about: Allen may give state entities confidence to willfully or
recklessly infringe copyrights.368 Furthermore, a state
apology is more powerful than an apology given by a private
party. A state apology delivers critical information to the
public that the state respects copyrights and creative works
and copyright owners can seek fair treatment, even if the
infringer is a state.369
On the other hand, all artists, authors, creators, or even
the whole society, are not merely observers of a state apology
to a copyright owner, but rather participants or potential
recipients. Artists or authors are empathetic towards the
injured authors who seek pleasant recovery from an alleged
state infringer.370 Their perception of the copyright regime
and state governments is influenced by the perception of
judgment by their peers—the injured copyright owners.371
The interviews conducted by the Copyright Alliance indicate
that the constant ignorance or perfunctory attitudes received
from state entities after copyright owners sent concerns
about copyright infringement by the state entities resulted
in self-doubt and self-devaluation.372 Therefore, creators
need positive signals from the public sector, emboldening

367. See id. at 1291–92 (asserting that public apology can affect organizational
behavior); Bennett & Dewberry, supra note 360, at 11.
368. David Newhoff, Allen v. Cooper Revisited III: Data Suggests States
Willfully Infringe Copyrights, THE ILLUSION OF MORE (Sep. 15, 2020),
https://illusionofmore.com/allen-v-cooper-revisited-iii-data-suggests-stateswillfully-infringe-copyrights.
369. Bennett & Dewberry, supra note 360, at 19; see generally Mark
Greenberg, How Law Affects Behavior, 9 JURIS. 374 (2018) (explaining that law
consistent with moral standards can affect people’s behavior); LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, IMPACT: HOW LAW AFFECTS BEHAVIOR (2016) (suggesting that the
experience of peers and moral issues affect how people react to a law).
370. Risen & Gilovich, supra note 332, at 419.
371. See Ariel Zuckerbrot, Impact: How Law Affects Behavior, by Lawrence M.
Friedman, 55 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 846, 851 (2019).
372. See Copyright Alliance, supra note 27, at 17–25.
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their creative incentives. Regardless of the frequency that a
state entity will be compelled, or voluntarily offer, to provide
apologies to copyright owners, adding state apology for
copyright infringement issues in legislation will give people
confidence in copyright protection, stabilizing or promoting
their innovation incentives and enthusiasm for creativity.
V. OBSTACLES TO INTRODUCING STATE APOLOGIES
There are primarily two criticisms of using apologies in
copyright issues. First, the First Amendment prohibits the
enforcement of court-ordered apologies. Second, the use of
apology does not fit within American culture. Nevertheless,
neither of the two criticisms matter when a state is asked to
apologize for its impermissible use of copyrighted work.
The First Amendment, which protects freedom of speech,
precludes compelled apologies given by private parties but
not the government. Practically, courts reject claims
requesting an apology by citing the First Amendment.373
However, in academia, White, the first scholar to thoroughly
analyze the legal obstacles of adopting compelled apologies
in the U.S., suggests the First Amendment precludes
apologies ordered against individuals and firms.374 After
White, scholars consensually agree that a compelled apology
is not enforceable due to the First Amendment.375 However,
White distinguishes government apologies from apologies
given by private parties and argues that government
apologies do not raise First Amendment concerns.376 Even
though he indicated that compelling government officials to
373. See, e.g., Griffith v. Clarke, 30 Va. Cir. 250, 270 (Cir. Ct. City of Rich.
1993) (“First Amendment concerns preclude the Court from ordering the apology
originally suggested by [the plaintiff].”).
374. See White, supra note 267, at 1299.
375. See Robyn Carroll, You Can’t Order Sorriness, So Is There Any Value in
an Ordered Apology? An Analysis of Ordered Apologies in Anti-Discrimination
Cases, 33 UNSW L. J. 360, 361 n.4 (2010).
376. White, supra note 267, at 1299 (“First Amendment concerns do not arise
in compelling state actors to apologize . . . .”).
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apologize may still be barred by the First Amendment,377
requiring government officials to do so may not raise such
concerns when the apologies function as rewards,
strengthening the faith of authors in the copyright regime so
as to promote innovation and settlements, rather than
express regrets or trigger infringement liability.
American culture is not incompatible with apology.378 It
is a conventional view that America and Asian countries
have divergent cultures on apology.379 Japanese people and
firms use apologies to present group hierarchy and
harmony.380 By contrast, American people may be frightened
by apology because of perceived legal consequences or
liability raised by an apology.381 However, as apology
protection is broadly adopted in many states in the U.S.,
scholars have started recognizing that this apparent cultural
divergence was a misunderstanding in the use of apology for
dispute resolution.382 People or firms in the U.S., Japan,
other Asian countries, and other countries similarly value
apology as an injured party and consider litigation risks and
costs in delivering an apology as an offender.383 In criminal
actions, compelled apologies are broadly accepted by the U.S.
legal mechanism as a “cost-effective means of deterring

377. See id. at 1300.
378. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Apologies as Intellectual Property Remedies:
Lessons from China, 44 CONN. L. REV. 883, 884 (2012) (“American culture values
apology.”); White, supra note 267, at 1265 (“Apology is important in American
culture.”).
379. See Ilhyung Lee, The Law and Culture of the Apology in Korean Dispute
Settlement (With Japan and the United States in Mind), 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 2
(2005).
380. See Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology:
Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 J. L. & SOC’Y ASSOC. 461,
493 (2016).
381. See id. at 464.
382. See White, supra note 267, at 1282–83; cf. Nguyen, supra note 378, at 885
(showing that many American people believe that apology is a norm of Chinese
or Asian culture).
383. See Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 380, at 484.
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crime, exacting retribution, and reinforcing social norms, . . .
healing psychic wounds.”384 In civil proceedings, apologies
are also increasingly recommended by scholars for promoting
settlement.385 What makes the difference in the use of
apology in civil proceedings is not the difference in culture
but rather the legal consequences of apologizing.386 Now is
the moment to introduce both compelled and voluntary state
apologies to the copyright regime.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Allen is a doubleedged sword. On the one hand, it solves a constitutional
question and can promote litigation efficiency. On the other
hand, it aggravates the imbalanced bargaining power
between states and copyright owners and may harm
innovation incentives because of uncompensated economic
and non-economic losses borne by copyright owners.
Therefore, when enjoying the benefits of sovereign
immunity, legislators and state entities should consider
using compelled or voluntary apologies to repair the
relationships between a state offender and a harmed
copyright owner. By offering apologies, not only can litigation
efficiency be achieved, but states can also secure their
purpose of promoting innovation and creative expressions.
Congress and the federal government may also consider this
apology proposal for copyright infringement against the
federal government.387 This proposal relies on the
effectiveness of apology in copyright infringement cases. This
effectiveness still requires further research and empirical
evidence. If apology is found ineffective, an alternative

384. White, supra note 267, at 1268.
385. See, e.g., Robbennolt, supra note 276, at 91.
386. See Vines, supra note 277, at 1–2 (discussing the history of apology, which
was considered unpopular because it resulted in tort liability).
387. Federal sovereign immunity is waived by the Administrative Procedure
Act if plaintiffs pursue equitable relief. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2020).
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proposal after Allen may be to implement compulsory
licenses for state use, rather than argue under the fair-use
doctrine or sovereign immunity.

